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Abstract
This Note argues that the new Brazilian debt-for-nature swap legislation, if passed in its cur-
rent form, will make debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil more financially attractive to international
and Brazilian non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”). Part I provides a description of a typ-
ical debt-for-nature swap, the purposes of a debt-for-nature swap, and the interests of the U.S.
government and U.S. NGOs in debt-for-nature swaps. Part I also discusses the grounds for the
initially adamant Brazilian opposition to debt-for-nature swaps and the recent moderation of this
opposition. Part II reviews the changes in the policies of the Brazilian government toward debt-for-
nature swaps, from the pragmatic but modest measures taken by the Collor administration (1990
to 1992) to the outright approval of debt-for-nature swaps by the Franco administration (1992 to
present). Part III analyzes the differences between the current Brazilian debt-for-nature swap reg-
ulations and the proposed legislation, highlighting the benefits of the latter. Part III also sets forth
several policy recommendations directed at the U.S. government and U.S. NGOs. Finally, this
Note concludes that, if complemented by the policy recommendations presented in Part III, the
proposed Brazilian legislation will weaken the lingering Brazilian opposition to debt-for-nature
swaps and ensure that the interests of the U.S. government and U.S. NGOs in these transactions
are preserved.
NOTES
THE METAMORPHOSIS: EXPECTED CHANGES IN THE
BRAZILIAN DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP PROCESS
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*
INTRODUCTION
The debt-for-nature swap process in Brazil is undergoing a
striking metamorphosis. As little as four years ago, the Brazilian
government forcefully rejected the idea of debt-for-nature
swaps' as an affront to Brazilian national sovereignty.2 The gov-
ernment based its opposition on the theory that debt-for-nature
swaps were a form of external control over the country's natural
resources and domestic policy.' In addition, many Brazilians be-
lieved that debt-for-nature swaps would legitimize the country's
large and controversial external debt.4 Today, in contrast, the
* The 1993 MCI-Fordham International Law Fellowship generously funded the
research for this Note. The Author would like to thank all those who graciously
consented to interviews in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Washington, D.C., and New York
City. The Author also wishes to thank Dean John Feerick and Professor Henry W.
McGee, Jr. of Fordham University School of Law for their efforts on his behalf.
1. SeeJ. Eugene Gibson & Randall K. Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 335-36 (1990). In essence, a debt-for-nature swap allows a devel-
oping country with a large external debt to obtain some debt relief by having an inter-
national conservation organization buy shares of the developing country's external
debt. Id. at 333. The international conservation group then donates its shares to a
conservation group in the developing country, which converts the shares into local cur-
rency or interest-bearing bonds that ultimately finance an environmental project in the
developing country. Marianne Lachman, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A Case Study in Transac-
tional Negotiation, 2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 139, 143 (1989).
2. James Brooke, Brazil Announces Plan to Protect the Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1989, at A5; Eugene Robinson, Brazil Angrily Unveils Plan for the Amazon, WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 1989, at Al. The rejection came in a speech by former President Sarney an-
nouncing a domestic plan, entitled "Our Nature," to protect the Amazon. Brooke,
supra, at AS; Robinson, supra, at Al. The President explicitly ruled out debt-for-nature
swaps due to sovereignty concerns. Brooke, supra, at A5; Robinson, supra, at Al.
3. See Priya Alagiri, Comment, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries'
Perspective on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 485, 496-503 (1992) (discussing
debt-for-nature swaps and sovereignty infringement on developing countries' govern-
ments and indigenous groups).
4. CONS6RCIO DE ONGs BRASILEIRAs, ASPECTOS POLtTICO-ECON6MICOS E ExPER-
ItNCIAS INTERNACIONAIS RELACIONADAS A CONVERSkO DA DIVIDA ExTERNA PARA PROJETOS
DE MEIo AMBIENTE [CONSORTIUM OF BRAZILIAN NGOs, POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES RELATED TO DEBT-FOR-NATuRE SwAPS] 2-3 (on file with
Fundaoho Brasileira para a Conservaoio da Natureza, Rio deJaneiro, Brazil) [hereinaf-
ter CONS6RCIO].
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Brazilian government is poised to enact advanced debt-for-na-
ture swap legislation that could significantly improve conditions
for the implementation of ecologically and financially successful
debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil.'
This Note argues that the new Brazilian debt-for-nature
swap legislation, if passed in its current form, will make debt-for-
nature swaps in Brazil more financially attractive to international
and Brazilian non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").6 Part
I provides a description of a typical debt-for-nature swap, the
purposes of a debt-for-nature swap, and the interests of the U.S.
government and U.S. NGOs in debt-for-nature swaps. Part I also
discusses the grounds for the initially adamant Brazilian opposi-
tion to debt-for-nature swaps7 and the recent moderation of this
As of 1990, Brazil's external debt totaled U.S.$116 billion. WORLD BANK DEBT TA.
BLES 38 (1991). At the end of 1992, the external debt was estimated to be U.S.$123
billion. Kirsteen Macleod, Putting Brazil's Political, Economic House in Order: Finance Min-
ister Cardoso to Sign Bank Deals in Canada, FIN. POST, Nov. 26, 1993, at 8. Approximately
U.S.$52 billion is in commercial loans. Review of 1992: An Extraordinary Year, Interna-
tional Reports - Brazil Service, Dec. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NSAMER
File. Many Brazilians question the legitimacy of this external commercial debt because
past loans were not accompanied by proper measures on the part of creditors to ensure
that the loans did not finance ill-conceived projects or disappear through corruption.
Mauricio Borges Lemos & Fernando Damata Pimentel, Conversbo da Divida Externa
em Projetos Ecol6gicos: Uma Breve Nota 2-3 (July 1990) (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
5. Interview with Dr. Dagoberto Koehntopp, Secretaria de Planejamento, Oroa-
mento e Coordenafdo, Secretaria de Assuntos Internacionais [Bureau of Planning,
Budgeting, and Coordination, Division of International Affairs (Brazilian Govern-
ment)], in Brasilia, Brazil (July 28, 1993). A draft of the new legislation was completed
in August of this year and is currently awaiting approval by the Brazilian National Con-
gress. Brazil Seeks to Facilitate Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Environment Watch Latin America,
Sept. 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File; see Antonio Piccirillo, Alle-
viating Sovereignty Concerns in Debt-for-Nature Swaps: The Case of Brazil 4 (Aug.
1993) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (outlining new legislation).
6. See Paula Rhodes & Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, Expanding NCO Participation in
International Decision-Making, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 153, 158 (Ved
P. Nanda et al., eds. 1993). An NGO is any actor in the international system which is
not a government. Id. NGOs can exist for humanitarian, commercial, or political pur-
poses. Id. NGOs can be multinational corporations, banks, churches, and even ter-
rorists. Id. Humanitarian or development NGOs are private organizations that seek to
relieve suffering, alleviate poverty, protect the environment, provide basic social serv-
ices, or promote community development. Id.; see Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 340-
45 (discussing relationship between local and international NGOs in debt-for-nature
swaps).
7. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing suspicions of foreign con-
trol over Brazilian natural resources and domestic policy, and widespread belief that
Brazilian external debt is illegitimate).
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opposition. Part II reviews the changes in the policies of the Bra-
zilian government toward debt-for-nature swaps, from the prag-
matic but modest measures taken by the Collor administration
(1990 to 1992) to the outright approval of debt-for-nature swaps
by the Franco administration (1992 to present). Part III analyzes
the differences between the current Brazilian debt-for-nature
swap regulations and the proposed legislation, highlighting the
benefits of the latter. Part III also sets forth several policy recom-
mendations directed at the U.S. government and U.S. NGOs. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that, if complemented by the policy
recommendations presented in Part III, the proposed Brazilian
legislation will weaken the lingering Brazilian opposition to
debt-for-nature swaps and ensure that the interests of the U.S.
government and U.S. NGOs in these transactions are preserved.
I. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS AND BRAZILIAN DISAPPROVAL:
AN OVERVIEW
Debt-for-nature swaps can be classified as either private sec-
tor debt-for-nature swaps8 or public sector debt-for-nature
swaps.9 The purposes of a debt-for-nature swap reflect the inter-
ests of the different parties involved in the transaction, including
the local and international NGOs, the creditor bank or govern-
ment, and the debtor government. In Brazil, questions of exter-
nal interference with natural resources and domestic policy1°
and the legitimacy of the Brazilian external debt"' caused the
Brazilian government to oppose initially debt-for-nature swaps. 12
Today, opposition based on external interference is weaken-
8. See Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 335-54. In a private sector debt-for-nature
swap, an international NGO purchases a debtor country's commercial bank debt and
donates the debt to a local NGO. Id. at 335-36. The local NGO then converts the debt
into local currency and uses the funds to implement an environmental program. Id.
9. See J. Eugene Gibson & William J. Schrenk, The Enterprise for the Americas Initia-
tive: A Second Generation of Debt-for-Nature Exchanges-With an Overview of Other Recent
Exchange Initiatives, 25 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 16-18 (1991). In a public
sector debt-for-nature swap, a creditor government, such as the United States, forgives
portions of its bilateral aid to a debtor country in exchange for the debtor country's
commitment to fund certain environmental projects. Id.
10. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing suspicions of foreign con-
trol over Brazilian natural resources and domestic policy).
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing widespread belief that Bra-
zilian external debt is illegitimate).
12. Brooke, supra note 2, at AS.
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ing,' s but questions concerning the legitimacy of the external
debt remain.14
A. Description of a Debt-for-Nature Swap
Although all debt-for-nature swaps vary to some extent,
most private sector debt-for-nature swaps follow a common
scheme. Normally, an international NGO acquires title to a por-
tion of a debtor country's external debt either by a donation
from a commercial bank or, more likely, by purchasing the debt
at a discount on the secondary market. t5 The international
NGO then donates the debt titles to an NGO in the debtor coun-
try (the "local NGO"),16 which then converts the debt titles into
local currency or interest-bearing bonds.1 7 The local NGO uses
the proceeds to administer an environmental program in that
country."'
In other private sector debt-for-nature swaps, the interna-
Stional NGO agrees to cancel the debt it purchased in return for
the debtor country's commitment to create a conservation fund
13. FUNDACAO. BRASILEIRA PARA A CONSERVACAO DA NATUREZA, SEMINARIO SOBRE
RECURSOS EXTERNOS EM PROJETOS DE MEIo AMBIENTE [BRAZILIAN FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, SEMINAR CONCERNING EXTERNAL FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTS] 7 (1989) (on file with Funda iio Brasileira para a Conserva to da Natureza,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) [hereinafter FBCN SEMINARIO].
14. CONSORCIO, supra note 4, at 2-3. An indication of the current feelings against
the external debt is the party platform of the leading candidate in the polls for Brazil's
October 1994 presidential election, which platform calls for the suspension of external
debt payments. James Brooke, Lula's Progress: From Peasant Boy to President?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1993, at A4. However, the candidate himself, Luis Indcio Lula da Silva, of the
Partido Trabalhista [Workers' Party] ("PT"), may prove to be more flexible than his
party platform. Id.
15. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 3. The secondary market is the market in
which public and private external debt is traded. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEBT EQUITY CONVERSIONS 17 (1990). The debt on the secon-
dary market sells at a discount reflecting the market's perception of the creditworthi-
ness of the debtor country and the ultimate probability that the debt will be paid ac-
cording to the loan agreements. Id. Commercial banks are willing to sell the debts of
many developing countries on the secondary market because full payment of these
debts is considered unlikely. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 3. For example, in
1987 Citibank, determining that full payment of Brazilian loans was improbable, re-
served U.S.$3 billion dollars for anticipated losses on Brazilian loans. Lachman, supra
note 1, at 141.
16. See Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 341. The international and local NGO
may or may not have had prior cooperative relationships. Id.
17. Lachman, supra note 1, at 143, 146.
18. Id. at 143.
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to protect certain areas.19 At least one debt-for-nature swap has
also provided for the cancellation of trade credits.20 Whether
the debt-for-nature swap affects external debt or trade credits,
the debtor country's government negotiates each phase of the
transaction with the local and international NGOs, from the fi-
nancial terms of the debt conversion to the details of the envi-
ronmental program.2" Ultimate approval of any debt-for-nature
swap, therefore, rests with the local government.22
A recent development has been the emergence of public
sector debt-for-nature swaps.23 Unlike a private sector debt-for-
nature swap, in which an international NGO acquires and con-
verts a country's commercial bank debt,24 in a public sector debt-
for-nature swap a creditor government 25 directly reduces its bi-
lateral debt26 to a debtor country in return for a commitment by
19. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 7-9, 14-15. Such swaps took place in Bolivia
and Mexico, for example. Id. In the Bolivian swap, Conservation International, a U.S.
NGO, purchased U.S.$650,000 worth of Bolivia's commercial bank debt for
U.S.$100,000. Id. at 7. Conservation International agreed to cancel this debt in return
for the Bolivian government's commitment to create a U.S.$250,000 fund to finance
the management of the Beni Biosphere Reserve. Id. In the Mexican swap, Conserva-
tion International agreed to purchase up to U.S.$4 million of Mexico's commercial
bank debt. Id. at 14-15. In return for the cancellation of this amount, the Mexican
government agreed to establish a conservation fund equivalent to 35% of the face value
of the cancelled debt. Id. For an overview of past debt-for-nature swaps in several coun-
tries, see id. at 7-15, and Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Extending the Fron-
tiers of Innovative Financing in Support of the Global Environment, 25 Irr'L LAw. 557, 565-71
(1991).
20. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 14. Such a swap took place in Madagascar.
Id. The government of Madagascar and Conservation International agreed to convert a
total of U.S.$1 million worth of Madagascar's commercial bank debt and trade credits
per year for five years. Id.
21. Id. at 4-5.
22. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 344.
23. Daniel H. Cole, Debt-Equity Conversions, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, and the Continuing
World Debt Crisis, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 80 (1992).
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing acquisition of commercial
bank debt for private sector debt-for-nature swaps).
25. See Cole, supra note 23, at 80. In 1990, the Paris Club, a group of Western
creditors including the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan,
agreed to sell or donate their government-to-government loans to developing countries.
Id.
26. See MALCOLM GILuS ET AL., ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 364 (2d ed. 1987).
Bilateral aid is aid given directly by one government to another. Id. Bilateral aid do-
nors normally disburse such aid through official aid agencies, such as the United States
Agency for International Development and Britain's Overseas Development Ministry.
Id. at 370.
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that country to fund environmental projects.2 7  The United
States has taken a step in the advancement of public sector debt-
for-nature swaps with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
(the "Initiative") .28 The Initiative aims to strengthen growth in
Latin America through increased trade, investment, and reduc-
tion of official debt owed to the United States. 2' The Initiative
allows a reduction of concessional debt3 ° owed by Latin Ameri-
can or Caribbean countries to the U.S. government under U.S.
international economic assistance programs.31 Such a reduction
would allow the eligible debtor country32 to pay a reduced prin-
27. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 16-18.
28. Enterprise for the Americas Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-549, tit. VI, § 602, 106
Stat. 3664 (1992) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2430-2430h and 22 U.S.C. § 2077); see
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: Hearing Before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and
International Organizations, Western Hemisphere Affairs, and International Economic Policy and
Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (giving overview
of Initiative); Walt Schaffer, Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Offers New Trade, Invest-
ment Opportunities, Bus. Am., Mar. 23, 1992, at 2 (discussing economic benefits of Initia-
tive); Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9 (discussing new generation of debt-for-nature
swaps brought about by Initiative).
29. Schaffer, supra note 28, at 2.
30. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 16. Concessional debt is debt that carries
interest rates that are lower than market rates and that may also include other terms
favorable to the borrower. Id. n.81.
31. 22 U.S.C. § 2430c. The Initiative authorized the reduction of loans under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1954) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.), and as food assist-
ance credits under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (1954) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.) (commonly known as "P.L. 480"). 22 U.S.C. § 2430c.
32. 22 U.S.C. § 2430b. Section 2430b states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) REQUIREMENTs.-To be eligible for benefits... a country must be a Latin
American or Caribbean country-
(1) whose government is democratically elected;
(2) whose government has not repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism;
(3) whose government is not failing to cooperate on international nar-
cotics control matters;
(4) whose government (including its military or other security forces)
does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights;
(5) that has in effect, has received approval for, or, as appropriate in ex-
ceptional circumstances, is making significant progress toward-
(A) an International Monetary Fund standby arrangement, ex-
tended Fund arrangement, or an arrangement under the... [Enter-
prise for the Americas] facility, or in exceptional circumstances, [an
IMF] monitored program or its equivalent, unless the President de-
termines . . . that such an arrangement or program (or its
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cipal in dollars while paying the interest in local currency into an
Enterprise for the Americas Fund" created by an Environmental
Framework Agreement 4 between that country and the United
States.3" The Initiative also allows for the sale of nonconces-
sional debt owed under programs administered by the Commod-
ity Credit Corporation 6 and the Export-Import Bank.37  The
purchaser of this nonconcessional debt must use it to finance
equivalent) could reasonably be expected to have significant adverse
social or environmental effects; and
(B) as appropriate, structural or sectoral adjustment loans from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the In-
ternational Development Association, unless the President deter-
mines.., that the resulting adjustment requirements could reason-
ably be expected to have significant adverse social or environmental
effects;
(6) has put in place major investment reforms in conjunction with an
Inter-American Development Bank loan or otherwise is implementing, or
making significant progress toward, an open investment regime; and
(7) if appropriate, has agreed with its commercial bank lenders on a satis-
factory financing program, including, as appropriate, debt or debt service
reduction.
Id.
33. 22 U.S.C. § 2430f. The fund must be used to finance, inter alia, "activities that
link the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources with local community
development." 22 U.S.C. § 2430g(d)(1). The fund shall be governed by an administer-
ing body composed of members of the U.S. government, individuals appointed by the
host country, and other individuals with broad ranges of experience. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2430g(c) (2) (A)-(C).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 243 0g. A framework agreement governs the operation and use of
an Enterprise for the Americas Fund. 22 U.S.C. § 2430g(a); see supra note 33 (discuss-
ing Enterprise for Americas Fund).
35. 22 U.S.C. § 24 30g.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 1738o-r (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion ("CCC") is a federally-owned corporation through which the federal governent
implements its policies to protect farm income and commodity prices. Ralph A. Lin-
den, An Overview of the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Procedures and Risks of Litigat-
ing Against It, I IJ. AGRIC. TAx'N & L. 305, 305-09 (1990). Its policies and actions affect
domestic and foreign aspects of U.S. agriculture. Id. The CCC has traditionally pro-
vided support to "middle-tier" developing countries, guaranteeing repayment terms of
up to three years on commodities consumed within a year. John A. Bohn, Jr., Govern-
mental Response to Third World Debt: The Role of the Export-Import Bank, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L.
461, 468 (1985).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 635i-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Export-Import Bank ("Ex-
imbank") is a federally-owned bank whose purpose is to promote U.S. exports by mak-
ing direct loans to foreign buyers of U.S. exports. Bohn, supra note 36, at 468-69. Ex-
imbank can also issue credit insurance and guarantee loans to developing countries by
other lenders. Id.
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debt-for-nature swaps," debt-for-equity swaps, s" debt-for-develop-ment swaps,4° or debt buy-backs.4"
B. Purposes of a Debt-for-Nature Swap
International and local NGOs enter into debt-for-nature
swaps because the leveraging effect of the debt-for-nature trans-
action allows these groups to increase the effectiveness of their
conservation dollars.42 This leveraging or magnification effect
occurs when the debt titles, purchased from a creditor bank at a
steep discount, are converted into local currency near or at face
value.43 This increase in funds improves the ability of environ-
mental NGOs to achieve their goals of preserving biological di-
versity44 and promoting sustainable development.4 5 These two
principles were the cornerstones, respectively, of the Biodiversity
38. 12 U.SC. § 635i-6(c)(1)(A); see supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing traditional private sector debt-for-nature swaps).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 635i-6(c)(1)(A). A debt-for-equity swap functions much like a
debt-for-nature swap, with the exception that in a debt-for-equity swap the purchaser of
discounted shares of a developing country's debt does not donate the debt for environ-
mental purposes, but rather converts the debt into foreign equity in a domestic firm in
the developing country, thereby actually acquiring ownership of assets in the develop-
ing country. DEBT EQurrv CoNVERSIONS, supra note 15, at 5-6.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 635i-6(c) (1) (A). Debt-for-development swaps function in the same
manner as debt-for-nature swaps, with the exception that the international organization
purchasing or receiving as a donation a developing country's debt uses the funds to
operate a development program, instead of an exclusively environmental one, in the
developing country. Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A Ne Opportunity for Nonprofits,
Commercial Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARv. INT'L L. J. 233, 245-46 (1990).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 635i-6(c)(1)(B). In a debt buy-back, a debtor government
purchases its debt at a discount from its creditor banks. Anthony Flint, When Nations Try
to Swap Their Way Out of Debt; Practices are Innovative, but Skeptics Say They're No Answer for
Empty Pockets, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 1990, at A14.
42. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 335-36.
43. Id. For example, if an international NGO purchases for U.S.$25 a debt note
with a face value of U.S.$100 and redeems it with the local government for U.S.$75, the
NGO will have multiplied its original U.S.$25 by a factor of three. Id. Without the debt
swap transaction, the NGO could have purchased only U.S.$25 in local currency at the
market rate of exchange. Id. at 336.
44. See Robert Fischman, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authority to
Reduce Risk. 22 ENVrL. L. 435 (1992), reprinted in part in WILLIAM WEINER ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 10-1 (1993). Biological diversity is defined as "'the variety
and variability among living organisms and the ecological complexes in which they oc-
cur' . . . in essence, a framework for sorting out what we know about nature." Id.
45. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON Fu-
TURE 24 (1987). Sustainable development is a model of economic development that
meets present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs. Id.
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Treaty46 and Agenda 21, both signed at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (the "Earth
Summit") 48 in Rio deJaneiro in 1992. Environmental NGOs are
eager to promote biological diversity and sustainable develop-
ment practices in Brazil because Brazil contains roughly thirty
percent of the world's tropical forests49 and is the most biologi-
46. 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for
signature June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992)
(not yet in force) [hereinafter Biodiversity Treaty]. The Biodiversity treaty will set "com-
mon requirements, definitions and procedures for ecosystem conservation and eco-
nomic utilization of the worlds' [sic] genetic resources." John Fitzgerald & David Favre,
A Summary of the Biological Diversity Treaty and Its Development, 9 ENDANGERED SPECIES
UPDATE 9 & 10 (July/Aug. 1992), reprinted in part in WEINER ET AL.., supra note 44, at 10-
10. The treaty has the potential to become the foundation for national policies and
international cooperation in protecting biodiversity. Id.
47. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. Agenda 21 was designed to be
the blueprint for the worldwide adoption of sustainable development practices. WEINER
ET AL., supra note 44, at 10-5 to 10-6. An 800-page document, Agenda 21 makes recom-
mendations dealing with: the socio-economic dimension of global environmental
problems; conservation and resource management; strengthening the role of non-gov-
ernmental organizations and other social groups; and the means of implementing sus-
tainable development practices (i.e., financing, institutions, etc.). Id. at 10-6.
Furthermore, sustainable development is recognized by the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change as an important component in combatting
global warming. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for
signature June 4, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part 11)/Add. 1 and Corr.1, reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (not yet in force) [hereinafter Convention on Climate Change].
48. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductoiy Note, 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992) (giving overview
of Earth Summit). Officially entitled the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, the Earth Summit was attended by representatives of over 170 coun-
tries. Id. The Earth Summit attempted to deal with the global challenge of achieving
decent living conditions for all people without destroying the natural foundations of
life on Earth. Benjamin A. Goldman, Equity and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, 4 FoRuHAM
ENvT'L L. REP. 1, 1 (1992). The Summit's underlying theme was the link between the
environment and development. Id. Documents negotiated and signed at the confer-
ence were Agenda 21, supra note 47, and the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative State-
ment of Principles for a Global Concensus on the Management, Conservation, and Sus-
tainable Development of All -Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1
(1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992). Documents negotiated prior to the confer-
ence but opened for signature at the conference were the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (1993), .reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992), the Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 46, 31 I.L.M. at 818, and the
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 47, 31 I.L.M. at 849; see Goldman, supra
(concluding that although Earth Summit represented advancement of ideals set forth
in United Nations Conference on Human Environment twenty years earlier in Stock-
holm, agreements in Earth Summit provide few guarantees that future global decision-
making will be more equitable).
49. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 19, at 577; see Michael S. Giamo, Comment, Deforesta-
tion in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative-Global Ecological Disaster, 18 ENvTL L. 537, 538
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cally diverse country on Earth.50
Debtor countries' governments enter into debt-for-nature
swaps because through such swaps they are able to repay an ex-
ternal loan with local currency instead of scarce external cur-
rency.5 1 These external debts and the requirement that they be
repaid in external currency have produced serious conse-
quences to the environment in debtor countries.52 To repay
these debts, debtor countries have intensified activities aimed at
producing exports, which in turn produce external currency.53
Export-producing activities include the leveling of forests for
timber and pasture lands and the destruction of woodlands,
which in turn lead to soil erosion, reduced water supplies, loss of
fisheries, and the extinction of species of flora and fauna. 4
Commentators have criticized Brazil and other Latin American
countries for engaging in these activities in order to service their
large external debts.55 Others have noted that it may be more
(1988) (noting that area in Brazil known as "classic Amazon" covers 3.5 million square
kilometers and, by itself, would constitute ninth largest country in world).
50. See Henry W. McGee, Jr. & Kurt Zimmerman, The Deforestation of the Brazilian
Amazon: Law, Politics, and International Cooperation, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 513,
516 (1990) (noting that Amazon contains perhaps half of world's species); Paul A.
Colinvaux, The Past and Future Amazon, ScI. Am., May 1989, at 102 (estimating that Ama-
zon rain forest contains up to 80,000 plant and 30 million animal species).
51. See Cole, supra note 23, at 64 (explaining that once debtor country is relieved
of having to pay external loan in hard currency, debtor country can then dedicate hard
currency reserves to capital investment and economic growth).
52. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, THIRD WORLD DEBT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES CONSERVATION 1-2 (Mar. 1986) (noting that environmental damage in debtor
nations has been caused not only by promotion of exports but also by lending condi-
tions that force debtor nations to enact domestic Spending limits, ultimately resulting in
elimination of environmental protection programs).
53. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 19, at 577.
54. Nancy Knupfer, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Innovation or Intrusion?, 4 N.Y. Irrr'L L.
REV. 86, 86 (1991). Tropical forests are also important to rural populations in develop-
ing countries, as these populations rely on forests for food, fodder, and fuel. Asiedu-
Akrofi, supra note 19, at 577. Industrialized countries, meanwhile, can use tropical for-
ests for medicinal and industrial products. Id. Furthermore, the clearing of forests has
been thought to increase the effects of global warming by not only reducing the Earth's
capacity to consume carbon dioxide, the most prominent greenhouse gas, but also by
releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as the trees are burned. McGee & Zim-
merman, supra note 50, at 519.
55. See, e.g., Nina M. Dillon, Comment, The Feasibility of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 16
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 127, 127 (1991) ("Tragically, the rate of tropical deforesta-
tion in Latin America has paralleled the region's astronomical borrowing patterns.");
Brazilian Environmentalist Urges U.S. to Halt Threats on Amazonian Deforestation, 12 Int'l
Env. Rep. (BNA) 180 (Apr. 12, 1989) (explaining that U.S. Congress was threatening
sanctions against Brazil to force Brazil to stop cutting and burning of Amazon forest);
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profitable .for these countries to leave their forests intact and
adopt sustainable development practices than to clear the forests
for timber or cattle grazing.
56
The advent of public sector debt-for-nature swaps 7 indi-
cates that creditor governments also have an interest in debt-for-
nature swaps. In the case of the United States, the Initiative5"
makes clear that debt-for-nature swaps are an important compo-
nent of a strategy of debt relief for Latin American countries.59
Debt relief, along with increased trade and investment between
the United States and Latin America, comprises the U.S. eco-
nomic policy of promoting economic growth in Latin American
countries. 60 Stronger Latin American economies, in turn, serve
U.S. interests by expanding the market for U.S. goods, services,
and investment capital.6"
Finally, commercial banks enter into debt-for-nature swaps
because the swaps are a vehicle for the banks to remove unpro-
ductive sovereign debt 62 from their balance sheets while receiv-
Brooke, supra note 2, at A5 (noting that Brazil announced domestic environmental
protection program in response to worldwide criticism of Amazonian development).
The current external debt owed by Brazil is estimated at U.S.$123 billion. Mac-
Leod, supra note 4, at 8.
56. Rain Forest Worth More if Uncut, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1989, § 1 at 18;
Emily T. Smith, Growth vs. Environment, Bus. WEEK, May 11, 1992, at 66.
57. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (describing public sector debt-for-
nature swaps).
58. See supra notes 2841 and accompanying text (describing Initiative).
59. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 16.
60. Shaffer, supra note 28, at 2. Although the Enterprise for the Americas Initia-
tive was a product of the Bush administration, the Clinton administration has an-
nounced that it will also promote the Initiative. Peter Hakim, Opportunity for the Amer-
cas, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May 27, 1993, at 18. The United States has also promoted
increased trade and investment with Latin America through the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), ratfled by Congress in November 1993. Helen Dewar,
NAFFA Wins Final Congressional Test, WASH. POsT, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al. NAFTA created
a free trade zone throughout North America. Id. Although Mexico is the only Latin
American country included in NAFTA, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have
expressed a willingness to allow Chile and Argentina to join the free trade zone in the
near future. Don Podesta, South Americans Bank on NAFTA; Trade Pact's Passage Viewed as
Crucial for U.S. Ties in Region, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1993, at A20. For a more compre-
hensive overview of the U.S. national interest in NAFTA, see NAFTA and the National
Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A26, and Henry Kissinger, NAFTA: Clinton's Defin-
ing Task, WASH. PosT, July 20, 1993, at A17.
61. Hakim, supra note 60, at 18.
62. See GILLIS ET A.., supra note 26, at 398. Sovereign debt is debt that is con-
tracted by a sovereign government as an obligation of an entire country. Id. Unlike
ordinary debt between private parties, sovereign debt is above the law and is not subject
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ing a modest return on the loans."3 This improvement in short-
term liquidity allows the bank to enter into new, and presumably
safer, lending arrangements. 64  Thus, one commentator de-
scribed debt-for-nature swaps as a link between the two problems
of non-performing debt and environmental destruction over the
bridge of sustainable development. 65
C. Brazilian Opposition to Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Questions of
Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the Brazilian External Debt
The Brazilian government intially opposed debt-for-nature
swaps.66 In a speech delivered in April 1989, former Brazilian
PresidentJos6 Sarney announced a domestic environmental pro-
tection program, entitled "Nossa Natureza"6 ' ("Our Nature"),
while rejecting debt-for-nature swaps on Brazilian soil.6" This op-
to external enforcement. Id. Sovereign debt is backed only by the good faith and
credit of the debtor government. Id.
63. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 335-36. In addition, the removal of insecure
debts relieves banks of the burden of carrying and restructuring these debts, which
burden hinders the ability of banks to attract new capital. Cole, supra note 23, at 67.
So far, however, commercial banks, especially larger ones, have not been induced
to donate developing countries' debts due to uncertain tax consequences. See Ronny
Jay Halperin, Comment, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation of Debt-for-
Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 721 (1989). The Treasury Department has tried to
encourage banks to donate external debt by allowing banks to claim a deductible chari-
table donation equal to the fair market value of the loan donation and a deductible loss
for the difference between the face value and the market value of the loan. Id. at 727-
28. A lender bank which donates debt to an international NGO would therefore re-
ceive the same net tax savings as if it had sold the debt on secondary market. Id. at 732.
This liberal treatment, however, may compromise future IRS positions in lieu of taxpay-
ers seeking similar treatment of "losses, bad debts, and charitable contributions outside
the context of debt-for-nature swaps." Id. at 737.
64. John K. Shubin & Daniel J. Gibby, The Promotion of Debt-Equity Swaps in Latin
America: A Survey of the Regulatory Regimes and the International Policy Framework, 20 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rv. 31, 41 (1988).
65. Lachman, supra note 1, at 142. "[D]ebt-for-nature swaps link the twin problems
of non-performing debt and' environmental destruction over the bridge of sustainable
development, by attaching economic health to ecological health." Id.
.66. Brooke, supra note 2, at A5; Robinson, supra note 2, at Al.
67. Julia Michaels, Brazil Amazon Plan Faces Stiff Odds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 11, 1989, at 3. "Our Nature" was designed to improve the government's environ-
mental policing measures, create ecological and economic zones and national parks,
regulate the use of mercury in gold mining, fund ecology training and research, and
establish a National Environmental Fund. Id. The program was criticized as an
unambitious and underfunded response to international criticism of Brazil's controver-
sial environmental record, including the large-scale burning of the Amazon and the
murder of environmentalist Francisco Mendes. Id.
68. Brooke, supra note 2, at A5; Robinson, supra note 2, at Al. President Sarney
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position stemmed from several arguments that together pre-
cluded the prospect of debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil. Many
Brazilians contended that debt-for-nature swaps infringed Brazil-
ian national sovereignty by limiting Brazil's use of its natural re-
sources and controlling Brazil's internal affairs. This contention
was strengthened by the debt-for-nature swap's association with
the related debt-for-equity swap," which allowed non-Brazilians
to gain control of assets in the Brazilian economy. Furthermore,
many Brazilians believed that debt-for-nature swaps would legiti-
mize the controversial Brazilian external commercial debt.
1. The Sovereignty Issue: Control Over Natural Resources and
Internal Affairs
Critics of debt-for-nature swaps in developing countries7"
have long asserted that debt-for-nature swaps violate the perma-
nent sovereignty71 of developing countries because they inter-
fere with developing countries' internal affairs and constitute a
declared a willingness to accept international aid to protect Brazil's environment, but
rejected any aid accompanied by conditions such as debt-for-nature swaps. Brooke,
supra note 2, at A5; Robinson, supra note 2, at Al. The President's language mirrored
that of the Amazon Declaration, issued less than two months earlier, in which the Ama-
zon countries expressed a willingness to accept international aid only if such aid was
unencumbered by "external impositions." The Amazon Declaration, May 6, 1989, art.
4, U.N. Doc. A/44/275, E/1989/79, Annex (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1303, 1304
(1989).
69. See supra note 39 (describing debt-for-equity swaps).
70. See L.K.JHA, NORTH SouT- DEBATE 22 (1982). Developing countries are those
that are in the early stages of development and that provide low standards of living for
their people. Id. Also known as countries of the "South," developing countries are
characterized by high levels of illiteracy, malnutrition, and child mortality, as well as low
life expectancies. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Is-
SUES, NORTH-SoUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 31-32 (1980) [hereinafter PROGRAM FOR
SURVIVAL]. Developing countries account for three-quarters of the world's population
but only one-fifth of the world's income. Id. at 32. There are at least four groups of
developing countries: OPEC nations with large financial surpluses; newly industrializ-
ing countries that are expanding rapidly; middle income countries whose economies
are expanding but still depend on exports of primary products; and low income coun-
tries with per capita income of less than U.S.$350 per year, Robert Cassen et al., Over-
view, in RICH COUNmRY INTERESTS AND TmIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1, 5 (Robert Cassen
et al. eds., 1982). For a discussion of developing countries' concerns over the growing
international environmental movement, see Patrick Low, Afterword: Trade and the Envi-
ronment: What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23 ENvrL. L. 705 (1992).
71. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 95 (9th ed. 1984). "Nor-
mally a state is deemed to possess independence and 'sovereignty' over its subjects and
affairs, and within its territorial limits." Id. A state possessing sovereignty has the au-
thority to control exclusively its own domestic affairs. Id. at 96.
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form of external control over developing countries' natural re-
sources. 71 Specifically, the interference and control allegedly oc-
cur when an international organization is allowed to supervise
the environmental program and use of funds generated by the
debt-for-nature swap.73 Consequently, debt-for-nature swaps vio-
late developing countries' sovereign rights to exploit their natu-
ral resources as expressed in United Nations Resolution 523
("Resolution 523")7' and United Nations Resolution 626 ("Reso-
lution 626") .7 Resolution 523 recognized that developing coun-
tries have the right to determine by their own accord the use of
their natural resources in order to further their national policies
of economic development. 76 Resolution 626 recommended that
all member states respect the sovereignty that each state pos-
sesses over its natural resources. 77 These resolutions were fol-
lowed by others that strengthened the concept of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources.78
72. Alagiri, supra note 3, at 496-503. Brazilian critics also assailed debt-for-nature
swaps on these grounds. See, e.g., Wilson Matheus, Amaz6nia x Divida Externa, in FUNDA-
co BRASILEIRA PARA A CONSERVACAO DA NATUREZA, DMDA EXTERNA, CONVERSAO E MEIO
AMBIENTE [BRAZILIAN FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE, EXTERNAL DEBT,
CONVERSION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT] 3 (on file with the Fundao~o Brasileira para a Con-
servao~o da Natureza, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) [hereinafter DIDA EXTERNA] (arguing
that Brazil's sovereignty allows it to use Amazon as it wishes, according to Brazilian
national prerogatives); Jodo Amazonas, Nuvens Negras na Amaz6nia, in DMDA EXTERNA,
supra, at 9 (denouncing debt-for-nature swaps as indiscreet intervention in Brazil's in-
ternal affairs); Marcelo Miranda Soares, Ecologia corn Soberania, in DMDA EXTERNA,
supra, at 5 (equating debt-for-nature swaps with indentured servitude).
73. Alagiri, supra note 3, at 497.
74. G.A. Res. 523, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119
(1952). General Assembly resolutions are not a form of international legislation. MARK
W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 50 (2d ed. 1993). Such resolutions,
however, are "not infrequently invoked" as evidence of customary international law. Id.
75. G.A. Res. 626, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952).
76. G.A. Res. 523, supra note 74, at 20. The resolution states that developing coun-
tries have "the right to determine freely the use of their natural resources and that they
must utilize such resources in order to be in a better position to further the realization
of their plans of economic development in accordance with their national interests." Id.
77. G.A. Res. 626, supra note 75, at 18. The resolution recommends that all mem-
ber states "refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise of the
sovereignty of any State over its natural resources." Id.
78. Alagiri, supra note 3, at 498 n.74. Resolution 1803 declared that the right of
each state to permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources must be exer-
cised in the interests of that state's development and welfare. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). Each state therefore
has the right to establish rules and conditions for the exploitation of such resources and
the import of foreign capital for that purpose. Id. Resolution 3202 asserted that the
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These arguments form part of a larger perception by devel-
oping countries of an environmental double standard on the
part of developed countries.7" This "hypocrisy" allegedly occurs
when developed nations, having exploited their natural re-
sources to develop economically, call on developing nations to
preserve their natural resources and thereby forego their own
development. Developing countries contend, therefore, that it
is unfair that they should have to pay for the world's environ-
mental ills when the principle causes of the degradation of the
world's environment are, arguably, the patterns of industrializa-
tion, consumption, and waste in developed countries.8" Accord-
ingly, Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan and
Chairman of the Group of 77,82 made clear at the Earth Sum-
new international economic social order should be based upon each state's permanent
sovereignty over its natural resources. G.A, Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 9, U.N. Doc A/9559 (1974). Furthermore, the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281) declared that "[e]very State has and shall
freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over
all its wealth, natural resources, and economic activities." G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
79. SeeJohn Vidal, Good Intentions Doomed &y Gulf Between Rich and Poor, THE GUARD-
AN, June 15, 1992, at 6 (discussing "winners" and "losers" of Earth Summit and noting
that "rich nations' calls for sustainable development and ecological restraint were
matched by developing countries' accusations of hypocrisy and attempts to control
their development"); PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL, supra note 70, at 31-32. Developed coun-
tries, also known as countries of the "North," are those countries that have industrial-
ized market economies. Id. at 31. This definition includes Australia and New Zealand,
two industrialized countries south of the equator. Id. Developed countries have a quar-
ter of the world's population but control four-fifths of the world's income. Id. at 32.
80. See Vidal, supra note 79, at 6 (noting that developing countries accused devel-
oped countries of hypocrisy at Earth Summit); North/South Conflict Will Hamper Environ-
mental Cooperation, Lawyer Says, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 4 at 131 (Feb. 24, 1993)
(discussing North-South conflict's hampering of agreements reached at Earth Summit).
81. The Amazon Declaration, supra note 68, art. 8, 28 I.L.M. at 1305; see Soares,
supra note 72, at 5 ("[Os] paises de origem [da idtia de conversdo da divida externa em
projetos ambientais] puderam se desenvolver a base dos pr6prios recursos naturais e
dos oriundos de paises [menos desenvolvidos] como o nosso. No 6 justo, portanto,
pretender que deixemos de utilizar nossas potencialidades naturais: nfo 6justo querer
impedir o nosso progresso.") ["(Those countries proposing debt-for-nature swaps) were
able to develop themselves through the use of their own natural resources and those of
(less developed) countries like ours. It is not fair, therefore, to suppose that we now
decline to utilize our natural potentialities: it is not fair to impede our progress."]
(translation by Note Author).
82. See BAtv E. CARTER & PILLIP R. TiMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 501-02 (1991).
The Group of 77 is a coalition of more than 120 developing countries in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America. Id. at 501. The Group of 77 was created in order to coordinate the
international policies of developing countries, thereby giving developing countries a
greater equality in affairs with developed countries. Id. Although an expression of
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mit 3 that developing countries recognize the importance of the
principle of sustainable development,8 4 but do not want devel-
oped nations to use sustainable development as a justification
with which to deprive developing countries of their right to
choose their own growth strategies.8 5
Brazilians in particular have been sensitive to any interna-
tional attention on their natural resources, especially the Ama-
zon rain forest.8 6 As early as the late 1940's, the Brazilian mili-
tary" challenged a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
unity among developing countries, the Group of 77 does not espouse a common ideol-
ogy. Id. Rather, it functions as a caucus for the economic and political concerns of
developing countries before various U.N. bodies. Id.
83. See supra note 48 (discussing Earth Summit).
84. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the concept of sustaina-
ble development).
85. WEINER ET AL., supra note 44, at 10-8.
86. See Brooke, supra note 2, at A5 (noting that in speech announcing domestic
environmental protection program, President Sarney invoked Brazil's "centuries-old
battle cry 'A Amaz6nia Nossal'" or "The Amazon is Ours!"); supra notes 49-50
(describing geographic features of Amazon); McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 50, at
515 (noting that Amazon contains deposits of manganese, aluminum, copper, tin,
nickel, iron, gold, and natural gas).
87. See E. BRADFORD BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL 505-38 (2d ed. 1980). In the
twentieth century prior to 1964, Brazilian military officers frequently intervened in poli-
tics by changing the civilian chief executive. Id. at 506. The military viewed itself as the
"poder moderador," or fourth branch of government, whose function it was to oversee
the three other branches. Id. at 549. In 1964, however, the military removed the civil-
ian president but did not return to its barracks, keeping power to itself instead. Id. at
508. Successive military governments strengthened the powers of the general-presi-
dents at the expense of the judiciary, legislature, and state and local governments. Id.
at 516. The first military government's objectives were achieving economic stability and
combatting communism. Id. at 509. Later governments stressed economic growth
above all other concerns, including environmental ones. See Giamo, supra note 49, at
541-51 (discussing military governments' Amazonian development plans). In attempt-
ing to achieve rapid economic growth through import-substitution industrialization and
the encouragement of settlement in the Amazon, the military government offered nu-
merous financial incentives, such as tax breaks and easy credit, designed to attract capi-
tal and settlers from Brazil and abroad. Id. at 541. Initial military governments oversaw
a period of impressive economic growth, which the military lauded as an "economic
miracle." BURNS, supra, at 533. Later, when it became clear that the economic growth
had been short-lived and had benefited relatively few, id. at 534, military rule came
under increasing criticism and the military finally ceded the government to civilian rule
in 1985. See, e.g., Alan Riding, Pragmatic Brazil Changes Course, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 20, 1985,
§ 4, at 1 (describing undramatic transition of power). Even today, however, as the civil-
ian government fails to control inflation of 2,500% per year and is embroiled in contin-
uous corruption scandals, the spectre of military rule looms over the civilian govern-
ment. James Brooke, A Vast New Scandal is Shaking Brazilians' Faith in Democracy, N.Y.
TIMS, Jan. 4, 1994, at Al. Civilian and military leaders reportedly planned a military-
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Cultural Organization ("UNESCO")"8 plan to create an interna-
tional institution for the Amazon region, entitled "Hilkia
Amaz6nica," as an international conspiracy to deprive Brazil of
nearly half its national territory.8 9 Other regional governments
supported the proposed institution, but due to the Brazilian mil-
itary's opposition, the Brazilian Congress never approved it.90
Thereafter, the government embarked on a series of develop-
ment projects in the Amazon for the purposes, among others, of
increasing population in the region and securing Brazil's claims
to its Amazon territory.9" The Brazilian development plans em-
phasized highway construction, colonization, large-scale ranch-
ing and agribusiness, lumbering, mining, and hydroelectric
projects. 92
In response to international criticism of the Amazonian de-
velopment plans,93 in 1978 Brazil joined Bolivia, Colombia, Ec-
uador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela in signing the
Brasilia Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (the "Amazon
Treaty") . The Amazon Treaty sought to promote harmonious
style coup in the fall of 1993, but backed down when the plan was rejected by President
Franco. Brazilian Official Tells of '93 Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at A8.
88. See ROGER A. COATE, UNILATERALISM, IDEOLOGY, & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-36
(1988). Founded in 1945, UNESCO is a functional agency of the United Nations man-
dated to promote worldwide collaboration in education, science, culture, and commu-
nications. Id. at 36. Critics have recently accused UNESCO of becoming increasingly
politicized and departing from its original mandate. See generally CLARE WELLS, THE
UN, UNESCO AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1987) (discussing politicization of
UNESCO).
89. Otto Lara Resende, 0 Controvertido Verde de Nossas Matas, in DIVIDA EXTERNA,
supra note 72, at 13.
90. Id.
91. Giamo, supra note 49, at 542. The Brazilian government felt compelled to se-
cure this territory in part because the other Amazon countries, in particular Peru and
Venezuela, were also strengthening their shares of the Amazon by occupying their own
territories. Id.
92. Id. at 541-53; see McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 50, at 524-28. The Amazo-
nian development plans "probably helped to integrate the historically remote Amazon
into the Brazilian nation state and led to economic development in the region." Id. at
527. However, the development of the Amazon may have also led to "extensive and
potentially catastrophic deforestation," Id.
93. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing Amazonian develop-
ment plans).
94. Brasilia Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M.
1045 (1978) [hereinafter Amazon Treaty]; see Military, Other Groups Press Their Claims for
Amazon's Future, Lagniappe Letter, Oct. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NSAMER File (stating that Brazil signed Amazon Treaty in response to international
criticism of Amazonian development plans).
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development in the Amazon region in a manner that would raise
the standard of living of the region's peoples and incorporate
the Amazon into the respective national economies of the par-
ties to the treaty.95 In Article I of the Amazon Treaty the parties
agreed to undertake joint actions to achieve such harmonious
development while preserving the environment and conserving
natural resources.9" This commitment to the environment was
conditioned, however, upon equitable and profitable results for
all parties.97 Furthermore, Article IV echoed the 1952 United
Nations resolutions98 in affirming that the sovereignty of each
country allows it the inherent right to determine the exclusive
use of the natural resources within its territory. 99
The Amazon Treaty had little effect on the environmental
and developmental practices in the Amazon region because the
treaty focused predominantly on national sovereignty and lacked
substantive provisions to implement its objectives.' A decade
later, however, the parties to the Amazon Treaty signed the Ama-
zon Declaration,' a non-binding statement in which the parties
to the Amazon Treaty called for the promotion of sustainable
development practices in the region.10 2 The parties recognized
the importance of the rational use of the resources in the Ama-
zon region °3 while reaffirming the sovereign right of each coun-
try to manage freely its natural resources.10 4 In declaring this
freedom to manage natural resources, however, the parties ob-
served the need for the economic and social development of the
region's people and the adequate conservation of the environ-
ment.'0° In addition, the parties expressed a willingness to ac-
cept cooperation from other countries and international organi-
zations as long as such cooperation did not include external im-
positions and was in accordance with the priorities of the parties'
95. Amazon Treaty, supra note 94, pmbl., 17 I.L.M. at 1045.
96. Id. art. 1, 17 i.L.M. at 1046.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing U.N. resolutions de-
claring right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources).
99. Amazon Treaty, supra note 94, art. 4, 17 I.L.M. at 1046-47.
100. Giamo, supra note 49, at 560. Indeed, destruction of the Amazon continued
unabated in the years following the signing of the Amazon Treaty. Id.
101. The Amazon Declaration, supra note 68, 28 I.L.M. at 1303.
102. Id. art. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1304.
103. Id. art. 2, 28 I.L.M. at 1304.
104. Id. art, 4, 28 I.L.M. at 1304.
105. Id.
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governments. 10 6  One such "external imposition" was the "na-
ture" aspect of the debt-for-nature swap.1 0 7
2. The Association with Debt-for-Equity Swaps
Brazilian opposition to debt-for-nature swaps increased be-
cause of the debt-for-nature swap's association with its older
cousin, the debt-for-equity swap."0  Brazil's debt-for-equity
swap experience produced some unfortunate consequences, 10 9
as transnational corporations forewent foreign direct invest-
ment 1 °  in favor of cheaper reinvestment through debt-
for-equity swaps. 1 1 Furthermore, the debt-for-equity program
contributed to higher rates of inflation,'1 2 an increasing public
deficit, 1 3 a widening 'gap between the official and parallel
rates of exchange," 4 and a palpable rise in speculative
106. Id.
107. See Brooke, supra note 2, at A5 (noting that when ruling out debt-for-nature
swaps, former President Sarney announced that Brazil would accept international assist-
ance to protect its environment, but would not acccept conditions to such assistance).
108. See supra note 39 (describing debt-for-equity swaps).
109. DEBT EQurry CONVERSIONS, supra note 15, at 72.
110. See GILIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 364. Foreign direct investment is that made
by nonresidents, usually multinational corporations, in enterprises located in the host
country. Id. Until Brazil's economic troubles in the 1980's, foreign investors were at-
tracted by Brazil's vast size, growing population, market strength, natural resources,
inexpensive labor supply, tax and credit subsidies, as well as the Brazilian "Law of Simi-
lars," which called for placing tariff barriers on any product similar to a domestic manu-
facture. KEITH ROSENN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL 1 (1991).
111. DEBT EQury CONVERSIONS, supra note 15, at 79. Investment through debt-for-
equity swaps is cheaper than traditional direct investment because the investor engag-
ing in debt-for-equity swaps purchases the host country's debt at market value, which is
less than face value, and then exchanges the debt at a rate somewhere between market
value and face value, thereby increasing the value of the original investment. Id. at 6.
The Brazilian government placed strict limits on its debt-for-equity swap program
in 1984 after a U.S.$200 million conversion by Volkswagen do Brasil of discounted
Deutsche Bank debt. Id. at 74. It had been known that Volkswagen would have made
the investment regardless of the debt-for-equity swap program. Id. at 39.
112. Id. at 79. Debt-for-equity swaps contribute to inflation because when the local
government exchanges the debt paper into local currency, it increases the money sup-
ply, which in turn produces inflation. Id. at 42.
113. Id. at 79. A debt-for-equity swap increases a debtor government's public defi-
cit when the debtor government exchanges local currency bonds to protect against in-
flation. Cole, supra note 23, at 64. By doing so, the debtor government is in effect
trading international debt for internal debt, which may be more expensive due to
higher local interest rates. Id.
114. DEBT EQurry CONVERSIONS, supra note 15, at 79. The gap between exchange
rates occurs because the foreign investor, by engaging in a debt-for-equity swap, con-
verts a foreign obligation which was purchased at a discount. Id. at 43. This conver-
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practices."15 These factors together resulted in a loss of national
economic policy-making.
t1 6
Unlike debt-for-equity swaps, debt-for-nature swaps do not
grant ownership of any assets in the debtor country to an inter-
national institution.1 7 However, the belief that debt-for-nature
swaps would, by analogy to debt-for-equity swaps, grant owner-
ship of Brazilian territory to non-Brazilians as well as weaken Bra-
zil's internal policy-making led critics to portray debt-for-nature
swaps as part of an international conspiracy118 to exchange the
Amazon for Brazil's external debt.119 One commentator de-
scribed this alleged attempt to expropriate the Amazon's natural
resources as a naked intervention in Brazil's internal affairs,
wounding the dignity and sovereignty of the Brazilian people.
120
Brazilian military leaders took note and developed a "war hy-
pothesis"'2 1 to resist any attempts to internationalize the Ama-
zon.1 22 Meanwhile, economists warned that the Brazilian econ-
omy did not have the productive capacity to offset the monetary
sion, in effect, allows the foreign investor to acquire local assets at a preferential ex-
change rate. Id.
115. Id. at 79. Speculation occurs when individuals and corporations earning for-
eign exchange withold such exchange until they utilize debt-for-equity swaps to obtain
local currency at the preferential rate. Id.; see supra note 114 (discussing preferential
exchange rate resulting from debt-for-equity swaps).
116. DEBT EQUITY CoVmRSloNs, supra note 15, at 79. This loss of policy-making
prompted the Brazilian government to suspend its debt-for-equity program in 1989. Id.
at 72.
117. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (describing the mechanics of a
private sector debt-for-nature swap).
118. Amazonas, supra note 72, at 9 ("A Amaz6nia volta a ser alvo de conspirac;o
internacional.... Por tirs dessa campanha ... esti o antigo piano dos imperialistas de
ocupar a Amaz6nia para apoderar-se das imensas riquezas ali existentes.") ["The Ama-
zon is once again the target of an international conspiracy.... Behind this campaign
S.. is the old imperialist plan to occupy the Amazon in order to seize the immense
riches therein."] (translation by Note Author).
119. Soares, supra note 72, at 5 ("Algumas instituio;6es internacionais... chegam a
propor a troca da Amaz6nia pela divida externa. .. .") ["Some international institutions
... are even proposing the exchange of the Amazon for our external debt... "I (empha-
sis added) (translation by Note Author).
120. Amazonas, supra note 72, at 9.
121. Military, Other Groups Press Their Claims for Amazon 's Future, supra note 94. The
war hypothesis is a full-fledged war plan comprised of invasion scenarios and response
tactics. Id. The response tactics rely heavily on techniques of guerilla warfare. Id.
122. Id. One general was quoted as saying, "If these 'fools' try to enter here, we
will drive them out like enemy guerillas," in reference to environmentalists. Environ-
mentalists in Amazon Field Threats from Local Military Officers, Politicians, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 19 at 502 (Sept. 25, 1991).
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emissions involved in debt-for-nature swaps, 123 suggesting that
debt-for-nature swaps, like debt-for-equity swaps, would be infla-
tionary.1 2 4
3. The Legitimacy of the Brazilian External Commercial Debt
Finally, critics in Brazil opposed debt-for-nature swaps on
the grounds that debt-for-nature swaps would legitimize the Bra-
zilian external debt.12 5 These critics contend that the external
debt is illegitimate because the loans were incurred by illegiti-
mate military dictatorships,12 disappeared through corrup-
tion, 127 or were used for ill-conceived development schemes
which did not benefit the majority of the country's popula-
tion.12  Furthermore, some blame commercial banks for being
123. Lemos & Pimentel, supra note 4, at 2. The authors, both economists, argued
that the Brazilian economy was incapable of increasing production to neutralize suffi-
ciently the effects on prices of the emission of local currency or local currency bonds
that would be necessary in a debt conversion. Id. at 1-2.
124. Id. at 2; see supra note 112 (discussing inflationary effects of debt-for-equity
swaps).
125. Fabio Feldman, Member of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, Statement
Before the Smithsonian Institution/Natural Resources Defense Council Conference
"Debt-for-Nature Swaps Progress and Prospects" 9 (Apr. 17, 1991) (transcript on file
with Natural Resources Defense Council, Wash., D.C.) [hereinafter Smithsonian/NRDC
Conference]; see CONSc6RCIO, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that part of Brazilian external
debt is illegitimate).
Brazil, like many other developing nations, ran up large debts in the 1970's and
early 1980's from commercial banks eager to find borrowers for growing deposits from
oil exporting states. GILLIS ET AL., supra note 26, at 398. Global economic shocks exac-
erbated the debt crisis. Id. Notable were the rise in oil prices from 1979-81, the result-
ing worldwide depression, and the rise in world interest rates from 1979-83. Id. at 398-
99.
126. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 9 ("[M]any progressives... in Brazil be-
lieve that participation in [debt-for-nature] exchanges undercuts their argument that
the debt is illegitimate and should not be honored [because] the debt was incurred by
military dictatorships that did not represent the people . . . ."); see Keith S. Rosenn,
Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society,
38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 773, 774 (1990) (describing legitimacy of Brazil's 1969 Constitution,
promulgated by military pursuant to authority conferred upon itself, as dubious); see
also supra note 87 (discussing role of military governments in Brazilian economic devel-
opment).
127. Lemos & Pimentel, supra note 4, at 2 ("Uma s&ie de projetos financiados
corn empr~stimos externos incorreram em erros t~cnicos graves... quando n5o foram
alvo de corrupC~o e desvio de verbas .... .") ["A series of projects financed through
external loans encountered serious technical errors.., when not the objects of corrup-
tion and diversion of funds .... "] (translation by Note Author).
128. Id. The Agominas and Angra dos Reis projects are noteworthy examples of
poorly-applied loan projects. Id. Each operation is worth considerably less than the
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overeager to lend to developing countries without properly eval-
uating the prospects for repayment.1 29 Others claim commercial
banks surpassed legal lending limits130 in order to obtain higher
profits on external loans, which carried higher interest rates
than domestic loans. 31 Others feel that because of these higher
interest rates, the loans have already been repaid.13 2
D. Changing Attitudes: Brazilian Acceptance of Debt-for-
Nature Swaps
Arguments against debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil are losing
momentum.13 3 In a 1988 newspaper article, Brazilian Congress-
man and environmentalist Fabio Feldman13 4 denounced the in-
ternational conspiracy theorists as constituting an alliance be-
tween the "backwards sectors" of Brazilian society and the princi-
pal beneficiaries of the status quo in the Amazon." 5 Feldman
respective amount borrowed to fund it, and neither has the capacity to produce reve-
nues to repay its respective amount. Id.
129. GILLIs ET AL., supra note 26, at 398. Under the false assumption that sover-
eign debt always gets repaid, many commercial banks extended loans to developing
countries without properly assessing the debtor countries' export earnings capabilities
or the effectiveness of these countries' fiscal, monetary, and foreign trade policies. Id.
130. Knupfer, supra note 54, at 86. Commercial banks advised individual foreign
entities to borrow in their own names, thereby creating more borrowers per country
and bypassing lending limits. Id.
131. Id.
132. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 9.
133. FBCN SEMINAWIO, supra note 13, at 2 ("[A questio da utilizao;5o de recursos
externos para projetos ambientais n]do se trata [ ] de forma coercitiva[ ] nem alienante[ ]
da soberania nacional, mas de cooperaqdo internacional corn entidades brasileiras em-
penhadas em preservar o meio ambiente.") [("The utilization of external resources for
environmental projects) is not a matter of coercions or breaches upon our national
sovereignty, but rather of international cooperation with Brazilian entities dedicated to
the preservation of the environment."] (translation by Note Author); id. at 16 ("A
utilizagdo de recursos externos ndo fere a soberania nacional porque nio envolve a
negocia io e internacionaliza do de fireas em territ6rio brasileiro . . . .") ["The utiliza-
tion of external resources does not infringe upon national sovereignty because it does
not involve the negotiation or internationalization of areas within Brazilian territory
."] (translation by Note Author).
134. See Biography of Fabio Feldman in Smithsonian/NRDC Conference, supra
note 125, at 37. Mr. Feldman is a member of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies who,
as the leader of a pro-environment block of Brazilian congressmen, is credited with the
inclusion of advanced environmental provisions in Brazil's Constitution. Id. Mr. Feld-
man is also a founding member of several Brazilian environmental NGOs. Id. at 38.
135. Fabio Feldman, A Preservardo da Amazdnia, FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Mar. 8, 1989,
at A3, reprinted in DMDA EXTERNA, supra note 72, at 8. Feldman was apparently refer-
ring to pro-development politicians in the Amazon and the region's military leaders,
who some feel are looking for a new threat to justify military funding in light of the fall
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asserted that the international concern over the destruction of
the Amazon was valid in light of the complex nature of national
sovereignty in modern times, 13 6 an allusion to Principal 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration137 ("Principal 21"). Principal 21 recog-
nized that every state has the sovereign right to exploit its own
resources. 3  This sovereign right, however, is subject to the
state's responsibility to ensure that activities within its jurisdic-
tion or control are not harmful to the environment of other
states or areas beyond the limits of its national jurisdiction.3 9
Feldman also pointed out that Brazil stood to benefit from the
sustainable use of the Amazon, whose biological diversity could
turn Brazil into a key provider of new foodstuffs and medicines
in light of worldwide advances in biotechnology. 4 '
Meanwhile, the strength and number of conservation
groups in Brazil flourished with the advent of democracy in
1985141 and a new Constitution in 1988142 that accorded national
endowment status to the Amazon1 43 and granted each individual
of communism and Brazil's rapprochement with Argentina. See Environmentalists in Am-
azon Field Threats from Local Military Officers, Politicians, supra note 122, at 502 (discussing
views of Amazonian politicians and military leaders).
136. Feldman, supra note 135, at 8.
137. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human En-
vironment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, at 3-5 (1972), re-
printed in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. The Stockholm
Declaration is a non-binding statement of principles meant to guide global policies to
protect the human environment. Roseann Eshbach, A Global Approach to the Protection of
the Environment: Balancing State Sovereignty and Global Interests, 4 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 271, 296 (1990).
138. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 137, prin. 21, 11 I.L.M. at 1420. Principle
21 was echoed nearly verbatim 20 years later in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, supra note 48, prin. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 876.
139. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 137, prin. 21, 11 I.L.M. at 1420.
140. Feldman, supra note 135, at 8. For example, converting an acre of Brazilian
forest into pasture will produce 220 pounds of meat per year, but left intact that same
acre can produce 2,750 pounds of food per year. Smith, supra note 56, at 66. Further-
more, the one-time value of logging the forest can be worth as little as one half the
value of fruits, nuts, and other products collected each year. Id.
141. See, e.g., Elizabeth Heilman Brooke, As Forests Fall, Environmental Movement
Rises in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1992, at C4 (discussing rise of "an impressive domestic
environmental movement"); see also supra note 87 (discussing Brazilian transition to
democracy).
142. CONSTITUICAO BI.AsILEIRA [Brazilian Constitution] (1988). See Rosenn, supra
note 126 (discussing consititution's excessive length, detail, and convolution).
143. CoNsTrruicAo BRASILEiRA [Brazilian Constitution] (1988), tit. VIII, ch. VI, art.
225, § 4. National endowment status forbids the Brazilian government from permitting
the utilization of the Amazon or its natural resources without first assuring the preserva-
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the right to an ecologically balanced environment. 144 These
conservation groups were particularly influential with the admin-
istration of President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92),
which, as Brazil's first democratically-elected administration in
three decades, 45 showed itself to be more sensitive to popular
environmental issues than previous administrations. 146 Indeed,
it was the Collor administration that issued Brazil's first debt-for-
nature swap regulations in June 1991,147 one year prior to Bra-
zil's hosting of the Earth Summit.148
In addition to these developments, the spread of informa-
tion concerning debt-for-nature swaps in other countries, such
as Bolivia, Costa Rica, and the Philippines, helped to mitigate
opposition to debt-for-nature swaps in Brazil. 49 For example,
tion of the environment. Id.; see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (describing
past government development plans in Amazon).
144. CONSTITUICAO BRASILEIRA [Brazilian Constitution] (1988), tit. VIII, ch. VI, art.
225.
145. See Rosenn, supra note 126, at 773. Collor, however, was not the first civilian
president after military rule. Id. at n.1. That honor went toJos6 Sarney, who as Vice-
President-elect, assumed the presidency upon the pre-inauguration death of President-
elect Tancredo Neves. Id. Neves had been elected indirectly by an electoral college
vote in January 1985. Id.
146. James Brooke, Collor Receptive to Criticism of Brazil's Policy in Amazon, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1990, at A8; see James Brooke, Brazilian Leader Acts to Protect the Amazon,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at A9 (describing some of President Collor's environmental
initiatives, such as demarcation of indian homelands and acceptance of debt-for-nature
swaps); Brazil Beefs Up Efforts Aimed at Slowing Amazon Deforestation, 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 14 at 483 (Nov. 21, 1990) (noting that Collor government was increasing its
effectiveness in stopping deforestation with such measures as stiff fines, limited number
of permits for clearing or burning, and total suspension of tax incentives for farmers
and ranchers in Amazon).
147. Banco Central do Brasil, Resoluqfio No. 1840 de 16 deJulho de 1991 [Central
Bank of Brazil, Resolution No. 1840 of July 16, 1991], Dihrio Oficial [D.O.],July 17,
1991, at 14,153 (establishing Brazil's first debt-for-nature swap regulations) [hereinafter
Resolution 1840]; see Brazil Government Allows Pioneer Debt-for-Nature Swap, Reuter
Textline - Euroweek, May 15, 1992, at 7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File (discussing in general first debt-for-nature swap).
148. See supra note 48 (discussing the Earth Summit); see also Julia Michaels, Brazil
Hopes to Strengthen Image as World Focuses on Rio Summit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 3,
1992, at 1 ("Many Brazilians are hoping that after a decade of failed economic plans,
the summit will be a chance to display an improved environmental record and attract
foreign funding." For example, "in the weeks leading up to the conference, Brazil cre-
ated a series of national parks and announced the country's first debt-for-nature
swap.").
149. Lou Ann Dietz, Oportunidades e Controv~rsias: Conversfo de Divida por Na-
tureza [Opportunities and Controversies: Debt-for-Nature Swaps] -3 (Mar. 1990)
(presented at Seminfirio sobre Conserva Ao Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Florestal do
Cono Sul [Seminar on Environmental Conservation and Florestal Development in the
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Brazilians learned that no prior debt-for-nature swap involved
the sale or transfer of national territory to international
NGOs, 15 0 and that local governments and NGOs established the
projects' priorities.1 5 1  Brazilians also learned that the obliga-
tions of a developing country in a debt-for-nature swap agree-
ment were unenforceable." 2 Furthermore, no country suffered
inflationary side-effects as a result of the debt conversions. 3
The case of Costa Rica, a country much smaller than Brazil,
which successfully converted approximately U.S.$80 million
through several debt-for-nature swaps between 1987 and 1990,
was particularly noteworthy.1 54
Under the above circumstances, one commentator sug-
Southern Cone] in Foz do Igua~u, Brazil) (on file with FundaCho Brasileira para a Con-
servacdo da Natureza, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
150. Id. at 6. Initial reports in Latin America concerning the first ever debt-for-
nature swap in Bolivia, however, erroneously indicated that Conservation International,
the donor NGO, had actually purchased the lands to be preserved. Laurie P. Greener,
Comment, Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Latin American Countries: The Enforcement Dilemma, 7
CONN. J. INT'L L. 123, 166 (1991). The information generated much criticism, but the
local NGO was eventually able to clarify the situation. Id.
151. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 344. "Debt-for-nature swaps do not and can-
not take place unless approved and supported by the debtor country. All debt-for-na-
ture swaps to date have been initiated by either the debtor government or a local
NGO." Id. Complete local control of the debt-for-nature swap program may produce
unfavorable tax consequences for a U.S. NGO, however, as U.S. tax law allows deduc-
tions for a domestic charity's contributions to a foreign charity only if the domestic
charity exercises sufficient discretion and control over the use of the funds to ensure
that the foreign charity spends them in a manner consistent with the domestic charity's
functions and purposes. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B, 48. For a complete discussion of
the tax considerations pertaining to debt-for-nature swaps, see Halperin, supra note 63.
152. See generally Greener, supra note 150 (discussing unenforceability of debt-for-
nature swaps). Because debt-for-nature swap negotiations are complex and time-con-
suming transactions, insistence by an international NGO of strict enforcement mecha-
nisms, such as choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, conflict resolution, or waiver of sovereign
immunity provisions, could jeopardize the entire transaction as well as any future deal-
ings with local government. Id. at 178-79; see also TamaraJ. Hrynik, Note, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable, 22 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 141 (1990) (arguing that
lack of enforcement in first debt-for-nature swap in Bolivia will not affect success of that
swap but, as amount of money involved in debt-for-nature swaps rises, enforceability
void will need to be addressed).
153. Dietz, supra note 149, at 6. According to Roque Sevilla, former president of
the Equadorian NGO Fundaci6n Natura, Brazil's economy in 1989 was capable of sus-
taining up to U.S.$300 million in converted debt in the short term. FBCN SEMINARIO,
supra note 13, at 11.
154. Dietz, supra note 149, at 2. The Costa Rican government agreed to pay
amounts ranging from 30% to 75% of the face value of the converted amounts in the
form of medium-term local currency "conservation bonds" that significantly reduced
the swaps' inflationary risks. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 11-12.
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gested that debt-for-nature swaps actually strengthen a develop-
ing country's national sovereignty in two ways.1 55  First, they
transform an external debt into a local debt. 15 6 Second, they al-
low the local government to maintain more effective control
over lands that it decides to preserve.'57 To illustrate the latter,
the Brazilian government currently lacks the funds to maintain
properly its system of federal, state, and local' conservation ar-
eas. t58 Often squatters live, farm, and hunt in these areas, effec-
tively destroying their ecological values. 159 According to the
commentator, a potential debt-for-nature swap providing fund-
ing for their proper maintenance would strengthen the Brazilian
domestic policy behind the formation of these conservation ar-
eas. 60 Whether or not most Brazilians would agree, the above
commentator's viewpoint demonstrates the evolution in Brazil-
ian attitudes towards debt-for-nature swaps. Opposition to debt-
for-nature swaps based on suspicions of an international conspir-
acy to control Brazilian natural resources and domestic policy is
today an extreme position.1 61
Much less radical, however, is the view that the Brazilian ex-
ternal debt is illegitimate. The party platform of the leading can-
didate for Brazil's October 1994 presidential election, for exam-
155. Dietz, supra note 149, at 6.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. FBCN SEMINARIO, supra note 13, at 6. The conservation areas can be divided
into those of direct use (National Forests, Hunting Parks, and Environmental Protec-
tion Areas) and indirect use (National Parks, Biological Reserves, and Ecological
Zones). FUNDACAO PR6-NATUREZA (FUNATURA), PROJETO PARA o ESTABELECIMENTO DE
UM SISTEMA DE SANTuARIOS DE VIDA SILVESTRE A NfVEL NACIONAL, A SER ADMINISTRADO
PELA FUNATURA [PROJECT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF WILDLIFE
SANCTUAJES, TO BE ADMINISTERED BY FUNATURA] 1 (May 1990) (on file with
FUNATURA, Brasilia, Brazil). These categories can be established at the federal, state,
and municipal levels of government. Id. As of 1990, the federal system consisted of 33
National Parks and 21 Biological Reserves. Id.
159. Julia Michaels, Brazil Opens Door to Environmental Funding, CHRISTIAN ScI. MON-
ITOR, May 12, 1992, at 4.
160. Dietz, supra note 149, at 6. Indeed, the first debt-for-nature swap in Brazil was
directed at conservation activities in a national park. Brazil: Government Allows Pioneer
Debt-for-Nature Swap, supra note 147, at 7.
161. FBCN SEMINARIO, supra note 13, at 7. "[A] quest~o da soberania 6 um arroubo
nacionalista jfi superado .... " Id. ["The sovereignty issue is an outdated nationalistic
frenzy."] (translation by Note Author). See generally id. (declaring on several instances
that debt-for-nature swaps do not infringe upon Brazil's national sovereignty).
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pie, calls for the suspension of external debt payments. 162 Fur-
thermore, the Consortium of Brazilian NGOs 163  (the
"Consortium") believes that part of the current external debt,
particularly that owed to commercial banks, is of questionable
legitimacy. 64 The Consortium has stated, therefore, that debt-
for-nature swaps are acceptable only if accompanied by bilateral
agreements restructuring the Brazilian external debt. 6 The
reason the Consortium required a restructuring is that a restruc-
turing agreement lends legitimacy to the Brazilian external com-
mercial debt by containing renegotiated repayment terms that
are likely to be considered more just than original repayment
terms.166 Furthermore, legitimacy of the external debt increases
162. Brooke, supra note 14, at A4. Current polls show Luis Inicio Lula da Silva
leading his closest opponent by a two-to-one margin. Id.
163. See Conservationists Form Consortium to Evaluate Country's Environmental Needs, 13
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 9 at 371 (Sept. 12, 1990). The Consortium was formed by
17 Brazilian environmental NGOs in order to "evaluate the country's massive environ-
mental needs and to study future funding mechanisms such as debt-for-nature swaps."
Id.
164. CONS6RCIO, supra note 4, at 2-3.
165. Id. The Brazilian government reached a restructuring agreement with 96.2%
of its external commercial creditors in December 1993. Brazil's Bank Creditors Agree on
$52 Billion Debt Package, BNA BANKING DALY, Dec. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CURRNT File; see Kenneth Gilpin, Dart Clashes With Brazil Over Loans, N.Y.
TIMs, Oct. 23, 1993, § 1, at 37 (discussing refusal of Dart family, one of Brazil's major
creditors, to sign restructuring agreement). The restructuring package was formulated
along the model of the Brady Initiative, declared by U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas
Brady in March 1989. Twin Shadows Settle Over Brazilian Debt Deal, LDC Debt Reports/
Latin American Markets, Oct. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT
File. The Brady Initiative encourages commercial banks "to reduce voluntarily the debt
and debt servicing obligations of debtor countries on a case-by-case basis." Alberto
Gonzalo Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American
Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 66, 70 (1991). The plan envisioned comprehensive
restructuring packages offering a "'menu' of market-based debt and debt service reduc-
tion options. The main condition for this support was that the debtor be implementing
a strong set of adjustment and reform policies that, combined with debt operations,
would provide for substantial progress toward external viability." John Clark & Eliot
Kalter, Recent Innovations in Debt Restructuring, 29 FIN. & DEv. 6 (Sept. 1992); see David
Felix &John Caskey, Baker to Brady to Chance? Tinkering with the Latin American Debt Crisis,
in UNITED STATES POLICIES AND THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES 5 (Werner Baer & Don-
ald V. Coes eds., 1990) (arguing that it is doubtful that Brady Plan will suffice to revive
economic growth in major Latin American debtor countries).
166. See Gilpin, supra note 165, § 1, at 37. Under the restructuring plan, creditors
were able to choose one of several options in which to convert their debt. Id. One
choice was to convert their securities into par bonds paying full face value but at a lower
fixed interest rate. Id. Another option was to convert the debt into collateralized
bonds converted at full face value at a four percent interest rate which will gradually
rise to a fixed eight percent rate. Id. Brazil requested that banks convert at least 35%
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because the current Brazilian government, unlike the former
governments that incurred many of the loans, is democratically-
elected. 16 7 Restructuring the Brazilian debt, however, may limit
the ability of an international NGO to engage in debt-for-nature
swaps. 168
It should be noted, though, that Brazilians view the portions
of their debt portfolio that are owed to multilateral development
banks ("MDBS") 1 69 and bilateral credit agencies ("BCAs") 171 as
of their securities into a third option of deep discount bonds with a floating interest
rate. Id. The request arose out of a concern by the Brazilian government that the debt
package did little to reduce its debt. Id.
167. See supra notes 87, 145 and accompanying text (discussing transition from
military dictatorship to democracy).
168. See First Debt-for-Nature Swap for Brazil Lacks Startup Funds, LDC Debt Report/
Latin American Markets, May 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File
(stating that environmental NGOs try to engage in debt-for-nature swaps before restruc-
turing packages drive up price of secondary market debt). Such a restructuring would
mean that the price of the shares of the Brazilian external debt on the secondary mar-
ket would rise because Brazil is theoretically capable of paying the restructured amount
of its external debt. See Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that secondary
market discounts result from impaired credit rating of debtor country, which results
from debtor country's failure to make full payments on original debt). This price in-
crease will reduce the leveraging effect of the debt conversion and make it more expen-
sive for an international NGO to engage in a debt-for-nature swap. See supra notes 15-18
and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of debt-for-nature swap transaction).
169. SeeJohn M. Updegraph, Note, Large-Scale, Capital-Intensive Development Projects
in the Third World: Congressional Influence Over Multilateral Development Bank Lending, 13
B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 345, 348 (1993). MDBs are independent, autonomous organiza-
tions formed for the purpose of financing development in developing countries. Id.
The four major MDBs are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(the World Bank), the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, and the African Development Bank. Id.
Thus far MDBs have not actively promoted debt-for-nature swaps. Asiedu-Akrofi,
supra note 19, at 583. The MDBs are concerned that the donation of these loans or
their sale at a discount would violate their charters. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at
386. Opponents of this view argue that the World Bank charter does allow the Bank
some flexibility to reschedule or refinance developing country debt and accept pay-
ments in local currency. Id. Furthermore, MDBs worry that such donations may impair
their credit rating on the international capital markets. Id. A lowered credit rating
would raise the MDB's cost of money and the interest rates it would have to charge
debtor countries. Dianne Dumanoski, Plan Urges World Bank to Swap Conservation for
Nations' Debts, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1987, at 8. The United States has encouraged
MDB participation in debt-for-nature swaps by directing the U.S. Executive Directors of
the MDBs to actively negotiate for MDB participation. International Development and
Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, § 1614, 103 Stat. 2508 (1989) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 262p-4i(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The most MDBs have done, however, is
to begin evaluating the environmental impacts of their loan projects. Asiedu-Akrofi,
supra note 19, at 583. For a negative view of the environmental assessment capabilities
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more legitimate than their commercial bank debt.17' The
greater legitimacy of MDB and BCA debt is due to two reasons.
First, interest rates on such debt are lower than those on com-
mercial bank debt.1 72 Second, these loans were accompanied by
more rigorous verification procedures to ensure that the loans
were not lost through corruption or misguided projects.1 73
II. CHANGES IN BRAZILIAN POLICIES TOWARD DEBT-FOR-
NATURE SWAPS
The Brazilian government issued its first debt-for-nature
swap regulations on July 16, 1991.174 These regulations allow
Brazilian NGOs to accept donations of Brazilian external debt
from international NGOs and to convert these donations into
local currency bonds. 75 The local NGO then uses the interest
on these bonds to fund environmental projects.176 In an effort
to streamline these regulations, the administration of Brazilian
President Itamar Franco is preparing a legislative proposal that
will revise the financial, dimensional, and procedural aspects of
the current regulations.1 77
A. The Current Regulatory Framework
In 1991, under the admnistration of President Fernando
Collor de Mello,178 the Central Bank of Brazil issued Resolution
of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, see McGee & Zimmer-
man, supra note 50, at 544-47.
170. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing BCAs and discussing
emerging role of bilateral debt in debt-for-nature swaps).
171. CONSORCIO, supra note 4, at 3; Lemos & Pimentel, supra note 4, at 3.
172. Lemos & Pimentel, supra note 4, at 3.
173. Id.
174. Brazil: Government Allows Pioneer Debt-for-Nature Swap, supra note 147, at 7.
175. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 3, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153.
176. Id.
177. Projeto de Lei, "Cria o Programa de Conversio da Divida Externa Doada para
Fins Ambientais, Sociais e Culturais, autoriza o Poder Executivo a emitir titulos de
responsabilidade do Tesouro Nacional para os fins que especifica e d! outras [pro-
videncias]." [Draft law creating the Program for the Conversion of External Debt for
Environmental, Social, and Cultural purposes, authorizing the Executive Branch to
emit notes under the responsibility of the National Treasury for the purposes herein
stated, and announcing other measures] (translation by Note Author) (1993) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Franco Proposal].
178. See supra notes 14548 and accompanying text (describing increasing influ-
ence of Brazilian environmental movement on Collor administration).
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1840 ("Resolution 1840"), 79 which established the Plano de
Conversdo da Divida Externa para Fins Ambientais ("Plan for
the Conversion of External Debt for Environmental Purposes"),
authorizing Brazilian nonprofit groups (i.e., NGOs) to receive
donations of external debt in' order to engage in debt-for-nature
swaps.18 ° Under this plan, the Brazilian NGO must deposit all
donated debt with the Central Bank in exchange for special non-
transferable federal treasury notes."' The Brazilian NGO never
receives the face value1 82 of the notes. Instead, it receives inter-
est of six percent per year, in local currency, payable monthly
and adjusted for inflation.18 3 Importantly, the NGO holds the
notes only as long as it implements its approved environmental
project."t 4 Once the project is completed, the notes are either
diverted to another approved project or simply revert to the Na-
tional Treasury. 18 5 During the life of an approved project, the
179. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153. A resolution
is an administrative act issued by a government authority, other than the Chief Execu-
tive, to carry out responsibilities accorded to it by law. MARIA SYLVIA ZANELLA Di PIETRO,
DiRETO ADMINISTRATIVO [ADMINISTRATE LAw] 176 (2d ed. 1991). As an administrative
act, a resolution must comply with the law in order to bear a presumption of validity.
Id. at 150. An administrative act can be' annulled or invalidated by the Executive or
Judicial branches of government. Id. at 176. The Legislative branch can also deter-
mine the legality of administrative acts which result in the receipt or remittance of
funds by the government or which create or extinguish financial rights and obligations.
Id. at 427.
The Central Bank is authorized by law to regulate the conversion of registered
loans, interests, or other due amounts into local investment. ROSENN, supra note 110, at
79 n.2.
180. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 1, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153. [0
Banco Central do Brasil resolveu i]nstituir o Piano de [C]onversfo da Divida Externa
para fins Ambientais, corn o objetivo de permitir o acolhimento, por parte de institu-
ii6es ou fundos sem fins lucrativos, mediante doaC6es, de recursos destinados i
preserva iio do meio ambiente." Id. ["(The Central Bank of Brazil has resolved) to
institute the Plan for the Conversion of External Debt for Environmental Purposes,
with the objective of permitting non-profit institutions or funds to raise, through dona-
tions, resources directed at preserving the environment."] (translation by Note Author).
181. Id. art. 3, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153.
182. BLACK'S LAw DICFIONARY 591 (6th ed. 1990). The face value of a note is the
amount as given on the note, payable upon the note's maturity. Id. In addition, face
value is the amount on which interest is calculated. Id.
183. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 4, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153.
184. Id. art. 5, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153.
185. Id. art. 5, 1, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153. "Concluido o projeto a que
inicialmente se destinaram os recursos, os titulos dever-Ao ser alocados [a] outros
projetos aprovados e indicados pela Comissio Tcnica de Avaliac.5o de Projetos
Ambientais, ou retornados ao Tesouro Nacional." Id. ["Upon the conclusion of the
project for which the funds were originally devoted, the notes will be allocated to other
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Central Bank has the authority to enter into agreements with
private or public Brazilian organizations, such as the Instituto
Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renoviveis
(Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural
Resources or "IBAMA"),1s6 to audit the project to ensure that its
funds are properly applied."8 7 The Central Bank also has the
authority to declare guidelines and measures for the execution
of Resolution 1840.1"" One such measure was Circular 1988,189
which established the limit of convertible external debt at
U.S.$100 million."' This limit, along with the above-mentioned
financial elements of Resolution 1840, was designed to mitigate
any inflationary impact that debt-for-nature swaps might have on
projects approved and referred by the Technical Commision, or will revert to the Na-
tional Treasury."] (translation by Note Author).
186. See Foundation for Nature's President Appointed to Head Environmental Agency, 15
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 7 at 194 (Apr. 8, 1992). IBAMA is Brazil's national environ-
mental agency. Id. It was created in 1989 and functions as an independent agency with
ties to the executive branch's Secretariat for the Environment. THE NATURE CONSER-
VANCY, BRASIL VERDE CONSERVATION CAMPAIGN 7 [hereinafter BRASIL VERDE].
187. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 7, D.O.,July 17, 1991, at 14,153. Article
7 states as follows:
Poderfi o Banco Central do Brasil, em articulagio com a Comissio Thcnica de
Avalia~do de Projetos Ambientais, firmar conv~nios corn instituiC6es pfiblicas e
privadas, em especial corn o Instituto Brasileiro de Meio Ambiente e dos
Recursos Renovfiveis (IBAMA) . . . [c]om a finalidade de fiscalizar e atestar a
aplica~gto dos recursos nos projetos pertinentes. [The Central Bank may, in
consultation with the Technical Commission, enter into agreements with pub-
lic or private institutions, in particular with the Brazilian Institute for the Envi-
ronment and Renewal Natural Resources (IBAMA), to audit and verify the
application of funds of pertinent projects] (translation by Note Author).
Id.
188. Id. art. 9, D.O.,July 17, 1991, at 14,153 ("0 Banco Central do Brasil baixar-A as
normas complemetares e adotara as medidas necessfirias 'a execup5o do disposto nest[a]
Resolugio."). Id. ["The Central Bank will declare the proper guidelines and enact the
necessary measures for the execution of this Resolution."] (translation by Note Author).
189. Banco Central do Brasil, Circular No. 1988 [Central Bank of Brazil, Circular
No. 1988], Difrio Oficial [D.O.],July 18, 1991, at 14,258 [hereinafter Circular 1988]. A
circular is an administrative act by which a government authority transmits internal
orders to subordinate authorities. DI PIETRO, supra note 179, at 177. Circulars are uti-
lized by superior authorities to guide subordinate authorities in the development of
administrative activities. JosE CRETELLA JONIOR, CURSO DE DIRErrO ADMINISTRATIVO
[CoURSE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw] 272 (6th ed. 1981); see supra note 179 (discussing legal-
ity of administrative acts).
190. Circular 1988, art. 1, D.O.,July 18, 1991, at 14,258. The figure is set in dollars
and not local currency because the external commercial loans being converted were to
be repaid in external currency, most likely dollars; see THIRD WORLD DEBT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES CONSERVATION, supra note 52, at 1-2 (discussing environmental impact in
debtor countries of paying loans in external currency).
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the national economy.' 9 '
Central to the procedures established by Resolution 1840
and Circular 1988 is the role of the Comissdto Tcnica de Avalia-
Cdo de Projetos Ambientais ("Technical Commission for the
Evaluation of Environmental Projects" or "Technical Commis-
sion"),192 created by presidential decree shortly prior to the Cen-
tral Bank regulations. 193  Resolution 1840 confers upon the
Technical Commission broad powers to evaluate and approve
appropriate debt-for-nature swap projects.19 4  In doing so, the
Technical Commission has the authority to determine which
projects should be given higher priority in light of the maximum
amount of convertible debt established by Circular 1988.195 The
Technical Commission also consults with the Central Bank on
any audits of approved debt-for-nature swap projects.196
Circular 1988 reiterates that any party interested in a debt-
for-nature swap must first obtain its project's approval by the
Technical Commission before the Central Bank will take any ac-
tion.'97 The Technical Commission evaluates debt-for-nature
swaps according to a prescribed set of official eligibility require-
ments. First, the project must fall within one of the following
subject areas ("Areas temiticas"): conservation of biological di-
versity; urban environment; energy; conservation and sustaina-
ble use of natural resources; environmental education; and insti-
191. Brazil: Government Allows Pioneer Debt-for-Nature Swap, supra note 147, at 7.
192. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, arts. 5-7, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153. An
interministerial group, the Technical Commission is chaired by a representative of the
Department of International Affairs of the Ministry of Finance and includes representa-
tives of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Secretariat of the Environment, and the
Central Bank. Decreto de 29 de abril de 1992 [Presidential Decree of April 29, 1992],
art. 1, § 1, Diirio Oficial [D.O.], Apr. 30, 1992, at 5427.
193. Decreto de 28 dejunho de 1991 [Presidential Decree ofJune 28, 1991], Digrio
Oficial [D.O.],July 1, 1991, at 12,671. The Technical Commission was reorganized pur-
suant to Decreto de 29 de abril de 1992 [Presidential Decree of April 29, 19921, supra
note 192, D.O., Apr. 30, 1992, at 5427. Presidential decrees are administrative acts by
which the President carries out his or her responsibilities pursuant to law. Di PIETRO,
supra note 179, at 175; see id. (discussing legal effects of administrative acts).
194. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 6, D.O., July 17, 1991, at 14,153.
195. Circular 1988, supra note 189, art. 1, D.O.,July 18, 1991, at 14,258; Resolution
1840, supra note 147, art. 6, D.O.,July 17, 1991, at 14,153; see supra note 190 and accom-
panying text (discussing U.S.$100 million limit imposed by Circular 1988).
196. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 7, D.O.,July 17, 1991, at 14,153; see supra
note 187 and accompanying text (discussing Central Bank's authority to audit debt-for-
nature swap projects).
197. Circular 1988, supra note 189, arts. 3-5, D.O., July 18, 1991, at 14,258.
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tutional development of environmentally-driven NGOs and re-
search organizations"'8  Second, the project must be
implemented by a local nonprofit organization.1 99 Third, the
project must have a pre-identified international donor.2 00 Next,
the project must fall within the U.S.$100 million maximum.0 1
Finally, the proposal must comply with the Technical Commis-
sion's procedural regulations.0 2 In addition to these five re-
quirements, the Technical Commission's decisions account for
the likelihood of the project's environmental and financial suc-
cess,20 and place significant weight on the qualifications of the
international and Brazilian NGOs.2 °4
To date the Technical Commission has approved only one
debt-for-nature swap project.205 This project is being imple-
mented by the Brazilian NGO Funda do Pr6-Natureza
206("FUNATURA"),2 in accordance with its agreements with
IBAMA 207 and the American NGO (and donor) The Nature
Conservancy. 208 The project funds conservation and manage-
ment activities in the Grande Sertdo Veredas National Park in
198. Comissio T6cnica de Avaliagfo de Projetos Ambientais, Edital No. 01/91
[Technical Commission for the Evaluation of Environmental Projects, Edict No. 01/91],
Di5rio Oficial [D.O.], Dec. 18, 1991, at 29,472.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Interview with Paulo Roberto Frana, Primeiro Secrettrio, Minist6rio de Re-
laC6es Exteriores [First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Environmental Division
(Brazilian Government)], in Brasilia, Brazil (July 29, 1993).
204. Id.
205. Comissao T~cnica de Avaliagiio de Projetos Ambientais, Resoluqiio No. 01 de
11 de maio de 1992 [Technical Commission for the Evaluation of Environmental
Projects, Resolution No. I of May 11, 1992], Didrio Oficial [D.O.], May 15, 1992, at 6083.
206. BRASIL VERDE, supra note 186, at 13. Founded in 1986, FUNATURA is a Bra-
zilian NGO dedicated to strengthening the role of the private sector in protecting Bra-
zil's biological diversity and quality of human life. Id.
207. INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DO MEIO AMBIENTE E DOS RECURSOS NATURAms RE-
NOVAVEIS, CONVtNIO QUE CELEBRAM 0 INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DO MEIO AMBIENTE E DOS
REcURsos NATURALS RENOVAVEIS E A FUNDACAO PR6-NATUREZA [BRAZILIAN INSTITUTE FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT AND RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES, ACCORD BETWEEN THE BRAzIL-
IAN INSTITUTE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES AND FUNDA-
CAO PRO-NATUREZA] (Sept. 5, 1990) [hereinafter CONVtNIO]; see supra note 186 (describ-
ing IBAMA); supra note 206 (describing FUNATURA).
208. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NA-
TURE CONSERVANCY AND FUNDACAO PRO-NATUREZA (Nov. 5, 1990). The Nature Conser-
vancy is an American NGO dedicated to the worldwide protection of biological diver-
sity. BRASIL VERDE, supra note 186, at 19.
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the interior state of Minas Gerais.2"9 The project's activities in-
clude efforts to strengthen the park's infrastructure and sur-
rounding community through educational programs and new
income sources. 21° Other debt-for-nature swap proposals were
either rejected by the Technical Commission or voluntarily with-
drawn because the proposed project either did not meet the es-
tablished criteria or lacked the appropriate funds to be finan-
cially successful.2 11
B. Expected Changes: A Statutory Framework
A proposal to the Brazilian National Congress by the admin-
istration of President Itamar Franco 2 12 will modify the current
debt-for-nature swap regulations. 21' Entitled "Programa de Con-
versdo da Divida Externa Doada para Fins Ambientais, Sociais e
Culturais" ("Program for the Conversion of External Debt
Donated for Environmental, Social, and Cultural Purposes" or
"the Proposal"), the Proposal envisions the modification of the
financial, dimensional, and procedural aspects of the current
debt-for-nature swap regulations.1 4 Unlike Resolution 1840, the
Proposal was developed subsequent to discussions between gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations.215
Under the Proposal, the maximum amount of convertible
209. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, GRANDE SERTAO VEREDAS NATIONAL PARK DEBT
CONVERSION PROPOSAL (Oct. 25, 1991). The approved plan calls for a two-phase swap of
U.S.$2,192,000 of Brazilian debt, which will generate U.S.$131,520 annually under the
financial scheme established by Resolution 1840. Id. at 12; see Brazil: Government Allows
Pioneer Debt-for-Nature Swap, supra note 147, at 7 (discussing details of the swap).
210. Id.
211. Interview with Paulo Roberto Frana, supra note 203.
212. See Lochinvar Goes West, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1992, at 41. Mr. Franco is the
former vice-president who assumed the presidency when the Chamber of Deputies, the
lower house of Brazil's Congress, voted on September 29, 1992 to impeach President
Collor. Id. The impeachment vote was a result of the President Collor's participation
in a high-level bribery ring which extracted millions of dollars from businessmen solicit-
ing government contracts. Id.
213. Franco Proposal, supra note 177; see supra notes 179-204 and accompanying
text (discussing current debt-for-nature swap regulations).
214. Franco Proposal, supra note 177.
215. SECRETARIA DE PLANEJAMENTO, ORCAMENTO E COORDENACAO, PROGRAMA DE
CONvERSAO DA DIVIDA EXTERNA DOADA PARA FINS AMBIENTAIS, SOCIAIS E CULTURAIS [SEC-
RETARIAT OF PLANNING, BUDGETING, AND COORDINATION, PROGRAM FOR THE CONVERSION
OF EXTERNAL DEBT DONATED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL PURPOSES
(OUTLINE)], art. 4 (July 1993) [hereinafter PROPOSAL OUTLINE]. Included in the discus-
sions were several congressmen and the executive secretaries of the ministries of the
Environment, Social Well-Being, and Culture. Id. Also included were representatives
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debt would increase to U.S.$200 million.216 Furthermore, a local
NGO that deposits donated debt into the Central Bank would
receive federal treasury notes that pay a high percentage of face
value instead of paying solely the interest on the face value.217
Payments would be made to the NGO according to four differ-
ent plans, each based on the expected duration of the proposed
project.218 Under a twenty-year project plan, the NGO would re-
ceive 15% of full face value up front and the balance in eighty
trimestral payments. 219 The NGO would also receive annual in-
terest of 4% on the remaining principal until the principal is
exhausted.2 2 0 A fifteen-year project plan would entitle the NGO
to receive 15% of full face value up front and the balance in sixty
trimestral payments. 22 ' The NGO would also receive annual in-
terest of 2% on the remaining principal until the principal is
exhausted.222 Under a ten-year project plan, the NGO would re-
ceive 15% of 95% of face value up front and the balance in forty
trimestral payments. 223 Finally, a five-year project plan would al-
low the NGO to receive 15% of 80% of face value up front and
the balance in twenty trimestral payments. 224
The proposal presents a shift of authority from the Techni-
cal Commission 225 to a more broadly worded Executive
Branch.226 The Technical Commission will continue to exist
under the Proposal, although its wide discretionary powers will
be curtailed.227 Article Six, the only article in the Proposal to
of several Brazilian NGOs, such as FUNATURA and the National Congress of Bishops.
Id.
216. Franco Proposal, supra note 177, art. 1. Eligible debt includes not only com-
mercial external debt, but bilateral credit agency debt as well. Id. art. 2; see supra notes
26, 170 and accompanying text (discussing bilateral credit agencies in context of debt-
for-nature swaps).
217. Franco Proposal, supra note 177, art. 3; cf supra notes 182-83 and accompany-
ing text (explaining that Resolution 1840 does not allow local NGO to receive face
value of notes, but instead allows for six percent annual return on face value).
218. Franco Proposal, supra note 177, art. 3.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text (discussing current functions
of Technical Commission for the Evaluation of Environmental Projects).
226. Franco Proposal, supra note 177, arts. 4 and 7.
227. Id. art. 6; cf Resolution 1840, supra note 147, art. 6, D.O., July 17, 1991, at
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mention the Technical Commission, states concisely that the Ex-
ecutive Branch will create a Commission to oversee the utiliza-
tion of the funds allocated to the debt-for-nature swap pro-
gram.22 8 Article Four states that it is the responsibilty of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to allocate these funds.2 29  Article Seven,
moreover, grants the Executive Branch, and not the Commission
itself, the authority to establish the rules necessary to implement
the program.23 ° In establishing such rules, the Executive will ob-
serve such factors as the monetary impact of the debt conver-
sions231 and the program's compatibility with the country's envi-
ronmental, social, and cultural policies.232 In addition, the Exec-
utive will have the authority to define which local institutions
may be the beneficiaries of donated debt.23 3 Under the Propo-
sal, these institutions should be national organizations with
proven experience in the field of the proposed debt-for-nature
swap project.234
The Proposal also widens the scope of debt-for-nature swap
projects. 235 In addition to the environmental projects that fall
under the categories currently defined by the Technical Com-
mission, local NGOs will also be able to submit proposals for so-
cial and cultural projects. 236 Debt-for-nature swaps, therefore,
would constitute only one type of debt swap under an umbrella
program providing funds to projects in areas such as health, edu-
cation, urban infrastructure, and the preservation of historical
monuments. 23
7
14,153 (granting Technical Commission authority to evaluate and approve debt-for-na-
ture swap projects as well as to decide which projects should have higher priority);
Circular 1988, supra note 189, art. 3, D.O., July 18, 1991, at 14,258 (stating that any
debt-for-nature swap project must first receive approval of Technical Commission
before Central Bank will take any action).
228. Franco Proposal, supra note 177,. art. 6. The Commission will be chaired by a
representative of the Secretariat of Planning, Budgeting, and Coordination. Id.
229. Id. art. 4.
230. Id. art. 7. "Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a baixar os atos necessirios [A]
implementa¢fo do Programa... ." Id. ["The Executive Branch is authorized to declare
the acts necessary for the implementation of the Program ... ."] (translation by Note
Author).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. PROPOSAL OUTLINE, supra note 215, art. 3.
236. Id.
237. Interview with Dr. Dagoberto Koehntopp, supra note 5.
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AND
PROPOSED PROCEDURES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The new legislative proposal by the administration of Itamar
Franco will improve the current debt-for-nature swap regulations
by creating a more streamlined debt-for-nature swap process and
offering more attractive financial terms to participating NGOs.
These improvements will increase the prospect of successful
debt-for-nature swap projects in Brazil. This watershed in Brazil-
ian policies toward debt-for-nature swaps presents an opppor-
tune time to reexamine U.S. policies relative to debt-for-nature
swaps. There are several steps that the U.S. government and
U.S. NGOs can take to ensure the success of the new Brazilian
legislation and the protection of the interests of the U.S. govern-
ment238 and U.S. NGOs239 in these transactions. These steps in-
clude a revised description and presentation of debt-for-nature
swaps,240 the encouragement of the donation of multilateral de-
velopment bank ("MDB") debt241 and bilateral credit agency
("BCA") debt,242 and the strenthening of relationships between
Brazilian and U.S. NGOs.243
A. Comparative Analysis of the Current Regulations and the
Proposed Regulations
The financial and procedural provisions of Resolution 1840
and Circular 1988,244 combined with the regulations of the
Technical Commission,245 have caused debt-for-nature swaps in
Brazil to be financially unattractive and time-consuming for in-
238. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing interests of U.S. gov-
ernment in debt-for-nature swaps).
239. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing interests of U.S.
NGOs in debt-for-nature swaps).
240. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (describing in general debt-for-
nature swaps).
241. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing MDB debt in context of
debt-for-nature swaps).
242. See supra notes 26, 170 and accompanying text (discussing BCAs in context of
debt-for-nature swaps).
243. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing role of international
and local NGOs in debt-for-nature swaps).
244. See supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text (discussing financial and proce-
dural elements of Resolution 1840 and Circular 1988).
245. See supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text (discussing current functions
of Technical Commission for the Evaluation of Environmental Projects).
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ternational and Brazilian NGOs 46 The new legislative proposal,
by contrast, will provide for a streamlined debt-for-nature swap
process that will allow NGOs to receive a higher return on their
investments. 247 As a result, there is an increased likelihood of
successful debt-for-nature swap projects in Brazil. Furthermore,
as a federal statute passed by the Brazilian National Congress,
the new regulations will bring relative stability to the Brazilian
debt-for-nature swap process,248 which is currently governed
solely by administrative acts of the Central Bank and other Exec-
utive branch organs of Brazil. 49
1. Resolution 1840: A Hindrance to the Brazilian Debt-for-
Nature Swap Process
The financial limitations and bureaucratic procedures es-
tablished by Resolution 1840 have caused it to be characterized
as "not user friendly"250 and a hindrance to the debt-for-nature
swap process in Brazil. 25 1 Conceived at a time when the Brazil-
ian government was negotiating the restructuring of the Brazil-
ian external debt with a view towards non-payment of that
debt,2 15 2 Resolution 1840 provides for a return of only 6% annu-
ally on any debt conversions. 255 This minimal amount has meant
that a project of even small dimensions would require large sums
of converted debt, thereby severely limiting the number of inter-
national NGOs that can raise such amounts, and placing a great
strain on the resources of those that can.254 Even if interna-
246. Interview with Dr. Anthenor Navarro, Director Executivo, Fundalfdo
Brasileira para a Conserva kio da Natureza ("FBCN") [Executive Director, Brazilian
Foundation for the Conservation of Nature], Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (July 6, 1993).
FBCN, founded in 1958, is one of the oldest environmental NGOs in Latin America.
BRASIL VERDE, supra note 186, at 15. FBCN is dedicated to the preservation of natural
resources in a manner that promotes sustainable development. Id.
247. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (discussing financial elements
of Franco Proposal).
248. Interview with Dr. Dagoberto Koehntopp, supra note 5.
249. See supra notes 179-204 and accompanying text (discussing current debt-for-
nature swap regulations).
250. Telephone Interview with DebraJames, Associate, Shearman & Sterling, New
York, New York (June 2, 1993).
251. Interview with Dr. Anthenor Navarro, supra note 246.
252. Lemos & Pimentel, supra note 4, at 3.
253. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing amount payable to local
NGOs per Resolution 1840).
254. See First Debt For Nature Swap for Brazil Lacks Startup Funds, supra note 168. For
example, while The Nature Conservancy originally planned to raise U.S.$850,000 to
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tional NGOs can raise such amounts, international NGOs would
be constrained by the U.S.$100 million convertible debt limit im-
posed by Circular 1988.25 This limit, which assures that at any
given time all debt-for-nature swap projects in Brazil together
cannot receive more than U.S.$6 million per year, restricts the
number and scope of otherwise viable debt-for-nature swap
projects. 256
Furthermore, the procedural requirements established by
Resolution 1840, Circular 1988, and the Technical Commission's
own regulations 25 7 have created a bureaucratic maze that frus-
trates the attempts of Brazilian and international NGOs to ob-
tain approval of debt-for-nature swap projects.258 Brazilian
NGOs are particularly critical of the broad powers conferred
upon the Technical Commission.25 9 These powers, they claim,
create a scenario conducive to arbitrariness and corruption.2 6
Finally, the fact that Resolution 1840 and Circular 1988 are
administrative acts by the Brazilian Central Bank,261 as opposed
to federal statutes, is reason for consternation among advocates
of debt-for-nature swaps.262 As administrative acts, Resolution
1840 and Circular 1988 can be withdrawn if the present adminis-
purchase the U.S.$2.2 million it intended to donate to FUNATURA, it has since en-
countered problems raising the necessary funds. Id.
255. Circular 1988, supra note 189, art. 1, D.O., July 18, 1991, at 14,258; see supra
notes 189-90 and accompanying text (discussing Circular 1988 in relation to Resolution
1840).
256. Interview with Dr. Anthenor Navarro, supra note 246.
257. See supra notes 180-204 and accompanying text (discussing procedures of cur-
rent debt-for-nature swap regulations).
258. Brazil Seeks to Facilitate Debt-for-Nature Swaps, supra note 5. The article quotes a
project coordinator at FUNATURA as complaining that a "bureaucratic maze" allowed
the Central Bank to take two years to approve FUNATURA's debt-for-nature swap with
The Nature Conservancy. Id.
259. See supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text (discussing current functions
of Technical Commission for the Evaluation of Environmental Projects).
260. Interview with Ana Maria Fonseca, Funda~io Brasileira Para a Conserva~do da
Natureza ("FBCN") [Brazilian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature], Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil (July 12, 1993); see Brooke, supra note 87, at Al. The Brazilian govern-
ment is currently enmeshed in a fascinating web of corruption scandals. Id. The scan-
dals range from the bribery ring run by ex-President Collor to a kickback scheme involv-
ing dozens of national congressmen. Id. When investigators questioned one congress-
man about his bank deposits of U.S.$51 million relative to his U.S.$84,000 annual
salary, the congressman casually explained that he had won 24,000 lotteries. Id.
261. See supra note 179 (defining resolution and discussing legal effect of adminis-
trative acts); supra note 189 (defining circular).
262. Interview with Debra James, supra note 250.
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tration sees fit, or if a new administration opposed to debt-for-
nature swaps assumes power. 63 The latter scenario is especially
plausible, as the leading candidate for Brazil's 1994 presidential
elections is Luis Inicio Lula da Silva ("Lula").264 Mr. da Silva is
the leader of the Workers' Party, whose official platform is op-
posed to the payment of the Brazilian external debt.265 The
prospect that a "Lula" administration will suddenly revoke the
current regulations, leaving the international and Brazilian
NGOs with an unenforceable agreement,2 66 has created a spec-
tre of instability that causes international NGOs to be wary of
investing their efforts and resources in the Brazilian debt-for-na-
ture swap process.267
2. The Proposed Legislation: A Watershed in the Brazilian
Debt-for-Nature Swap Process
The proposed legislation recognizes that Resolution 1840
has not succeeded in attracting international institutions inter-
ested in financing debt-for-nature swaps.2 68 The proposed legis-
lation will provide international and Brazilian NGOs with signifi-
cantly more financially attractive, debt-for-nature swap transac-
tions. 69 Instead of receiving a meager six percent annual
return, in most cases the Brazilian NGO will receive installment
payments eventually equaling the full face value of the converted
debt amount.2 7° The increased leveraging effect 271 means that
263. See supra note 179 (defining resolution and discussing legal effect of adminis-
trative acts); supra note 189 (defining circular).
264. Brooke, supra note 14, at A4.
265. See supra notes 14, 162 and accompanying text (discussing Workers' Party's
opposition to debt payments); supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text (discussing
Brazilian opposition to debt-for-nature swaps based on alleged illegitimacy of external
debt).
266. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing unenforceability of host
country's obligations in debt-for-nature swaps).
267. Interview with DebraJames, supra note 250. Some feel, however, that once a
"Lula" administration assumes power, it will moderate its nationalist views to reflect the
new realities of international cooperation, and therefore allow debt-for-nature swaps to
proceed. Interview with Paulo Roberto Franca, supra note 203.
268. PROPOSAL OUTLINE, supra note 215, art. 1.
269. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (discussing financial elements
of proposed legislation).
270. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text (discussing payment plans of
proposed legislation).
271. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing debt-for-nature
swaps' leveraging effect on international NGO's investment).
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international NGOs will not need to raise as much money as is
currently needed to sustain viable debt-for-nature swap
projects.272 As a result, the Brazilian NGOs that receive dona-
tions for debt-for-nature swaps will experience a substantial in-
crease in their spending power. The prospect of this increased
spending power, in turn, may cause some of the Brazilian NGOs
that remain opposed to debt-for-nature swaps 273 to moderate
their views once they perceive the swaps as a significant new
source of funding.274
The more attractive financial provisions of the proposed
legislation2 75 will also make debt-for-nature swap transactions
less vulnerable to a secondary market price increase resulting
from the restructuring of the Brazilian commercial external
debt.276 Under the new provisions, the secondary market dis-
count on the external debt does not have to be as steep as is
currently required for the conversion to be financially viable.277
272. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of debt-
for-nature swap transaction).
273. See FBCN SEMINARIO, supra note 13, at 12-13. Some Brazilian NGOs remain
opposed to debt-for-nature swaps due to the traditional arguments concerning national
sovereignty. Id. Other Brazilian NGOs, notably those of smaller scale, oppose debt-for-
nature swaps because of the inherent disadvantages of small-scale NGOs relative to
large-scale NGOs to attract international donors for debt-for-nature swap projects. Id.
at 14.
274. Interview with Paulo Roberto Franca, supra note 203.
275. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (discussing financial provisions
of proposed legislation).
276. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing impact of restructuring
on secondary market price of external debt); see also supra note 165 and accompanying
text (discussing completion of Brazil's commercial debt restructuring agreements).
277. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text (discussing financial provisions
of proposed legislation, which give international NGOs high percentage of face value of
donated debt).
Furthermore, a restructuring in practice does not guarantee that the debtor coun-
try will abide by its debt obligations. Brazil: Debt - Brazil Gets Serious, Reuter Textline -
Euromoney Trade Finance and Banker Int'l, Aug. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NSAMER File. Brazil, for example, has a reputation of not honoring its debt
agreements, such as the 1988 restructuring agreement, on which Brazil defaulted
within months. Id.; see ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 1989 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR
496 (1989) (stating that 1988 agreement rescheduled U.S.$62.1 billion of commercial
debt over 20 years, and provided for U.S.$5.2 billion in new money from World Bank, a
trade deposit facility, and bonds). This perpetual uncertainty concerning repayment
will guarantee that a certain discount, no matter how small, will always be applied to
shares of the Brazilian external debt on the secondary market. See supra note 15 (ex-
plaining that secondary market discount reflects impaired creditworthiness of debtor
country in response to perception that country will not make full payments on its exter-
nal debt).
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Therefore, under the terms of the proposed legislation, the es-
sential leveraging effect of the debt conversion should not be
lost on account of the Brazilian external commercial debt re-
structuring agreement.
Furthermore, the fact that the proposed legislation will cre-
ate a federal statute should reduce, if not eliminate, the air of
instability surrounding the current Brazilian debt-for-nature
swap process. 278 No longer will an administration be able to uni-
laterally revoke existing debt-for-nature swap regulations.279 Any
changes in the debt-for-nature swap regulations will also have to
be approved by the National Congress. 28 ° An administration un-
favorable to debt-for-nature swaps, however, may still be able to
affect the debt-for-nature swap program under the Proposal,
given the broad authority granted to the Executive Branch to
allocate the funds for the program281 and to implement guide-
lines for the evaluation of proposed projects.282
Furthermore, the proposed legislation attempts to stream-
line the bureaucratic procedures developed by Resolution
1840.283 The proposed legislation provides stricter guidelines
that the Commission must observe when it evaluates debt-for-na-
ture swap project proposals. 84 By limiting the broad discretion-
ary powers of the Commission, these guidelines should reduce
the risks of arbitrariness and corruption in the evaluation pro-
cess.
285
Finally, the proposed legislation, drafted after consultations
278. Interview with Dr. Dagoberto Koehntopp, supra note 5; see supra notes 261-67
and accompanying text (discussing instability of current regulations).
279. See supra note 179 (discussing legal effect and revocation of administrative
acts).
280. See supra note 179 (discussing power of law over administrative acts).
281. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing Executive's authority to
allocate funds for debt-for-nature swaps).
282. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (discussing Executive's author-
ity to declare guidelines for evaluation of debt-for-nature swap projects).
283. Resolution 1840, supra note 147, arts. 3-9, D.O.,July 17, 1991, at 14,153; Brazil
Seeks to Facilitate Debt-for-Nature Swaps, supra note 5 (noting that one objective of new
legislation is to streamline prior regulations).
284. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text (discussing rules to be estab-
lished by Executive for evaluating debt-for-nature swap projects).
285. Interview with Dr. Dagoberto Koehntopp, supra note 5; see supra note 260 and
accompanying text (discussing corruption scandals in Brazilian government and NGOs'
fears of corruption in debt-for-nature swap process).
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with various sectors of Brazilian society,28 6 provides for the useful
expansion of debt swaps to social and cultural projects.2 7 This
expansion not only removes debt-for-nature swaps from the pub-
lic limelight, but also includes in a larger debt swap process
other Brazilian NGOs. These Brazilian NGOs may perceive
themselves as having been unfairly deprived of the institutional
benefits which come from debt swaps and relations with interna-
tional NGOs.288 The inclusion of these groups should help re-
duce further the opposition to debt-for-nature swaps as the debt
swap umbrella grows and more people benefit from other debt
swap transactions.
B. Policy Recommendations for the United States Government
and NGOs
The shift in Brazilian policies towards debt-for-nature swaps
presents some important implications for the policies of the U.S.
government and U.S. NGOs. Even though the trend in Brazil is
clearly towards supporting debt-for-nature swaps, 2 9 there are
still several steps that the United States can take to mitigate the
lingering Brazilian opposition to debt-for-nature swaps and to as-
sure that future swaps are carried out efficiently and effectively.
In this manner the interests of the U.S. government 29 and U.S.
NGOs2 11 in these swaps will be adequately protected.
1. Presentation of Debt-for-Nature Swaps: the Shift in Focus
Commentators currently depict debt-for-nature swaps as a
transaction originating with an international NGO that acquires
a developing country's debt titles in order to preserve an area of
land in that country.2 92 The point of reference for a debt-for-
286. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing consultation process of
proposed legislation).
287. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (discussing proposed legisla-
tion's increased scope of debt-for-nature swap projects).
288. Interview with Paulo Roberto Frana, supra note 203. The benefits of a debt-
for-nature swap to a local NGO include increased funding and expertise in conserva-
tion activities. Dietz, supra note 149, at 7.
289. See supra notes 133-73 and accompanying text (discussing changes in Brazil-
ian views of debt-for-nature swaps).
290. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing interests of U.S. gov-
ernment in debt-for-nature swaps).
291. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing interests of U.S.
NGOs in debt-for-nature swaps).
292. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (describing debt-for-nature
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nature swap should switch, however, to the perspective of the
local NGO. A debt-for-nature swap, therefore, is a transaction
through which a local NGO interested in preserving an area of
land seeks an international NGO to help plan a conservation
strategy for the area financed through a debt conversion. In
other words, one should depict a debt-for-nature swap solely as a
financing mechanism for a pre-approved conservation plan
originating in the developing country. In this manner no one
can accuse the international NGO of attempting to control
either the developing country's resources or the conservation
plan's priorities.
Control of the debt-for-nature swap project's priorities is im-
portant to the Consortium of Brazilian NGOs 939 The Consor-
tium has made clear that only debt-for-nature swaps whose pri-
orities are established by the Brazilian government or Brazilian
NGOs are acceptable.2 94 A U.S. NGO, however, may face unde-
sirable tax consequences if it appears to grant complete control
of a debt-for-nature swap project to a local NGO.2 95 U.S. tax law
allows deductions for the U.S. NGO's contribution to a local
NGO only if the U.S. NGO exercises sufficient discretion and
control over its contribution to ensure that the local NGO
spends it in a manner consistent with the U.S. NGO's functions
and purposes.296
This apparent conflict between U.S. tax law and NGO policy
can be overcome by a carefully negotiated agreement between
the Brazilian and U.S. NGOs. Such an agreement can convince
the Technical Commission that the Brazilan NGO established
the priorities of the project while simultaneously satisfying the
U.S. tax law requirement that the U.S. NGO exert sufficient con-
trol over the use of its contributions to the project. A closer look
swaps). For examples of the traditional description, see Lachman, supra note 1, at 143,
and Alagiri, supra note 3, at 494.
293. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (describing Consortium of Brazil-
ian NGOs).
294. CONS6RCIO, supra note 4, at 5.
295. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing tax consequences of
ceding control of debt-for-nature swap project to local NGO).
296. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; see supra note 151 and accompanying text
(discussing tax consequences of cedingcontrol of debt-for-nature swap project to local
NGO).
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at Brazil's first debt-for-nature swap 2 9 7 demonstrates how this can
be achieved.
The Agreement of Cooperation Between The Nature Con-
servancy 298 and Fundaviio Pr6-Natureza ("FUNATURA") 299 ex-
plicitly states that U.S. tax law ° ° requires The Nature Conser-
vancy to exercise sufficient control over its contributions to en-
sure that the contributions are used to fulfill The Nature
Conservancy's objective of protecting biological diversity. 301
This contribution provision agreement appears in the context of
other language in the agreement granting FUNATURA appar-
ent control over the priorities of the debt-for-nature swap pro-
ject, including the responsibility for preparing the implementa-
tion plan for the debt-for-nature swap project.30 2 The agreement
gives The Nature Conservancy the task of assisting and approv-
ing FUNATURA's implementation plan. 03 The fact that this
agreement, in conjunction with FUNATURA's agreement with
297. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing first Brazilian debt-
for-nature swap).
298. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (describing The Nature Conser-
vancy).
299. AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATURE CONSERVANCY AND FUNDA-
,Ao PR6-NATUREZA, supra note 208; see supra note 206 and accompanying text (describ-
ing FUNATURA).
300. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; see supra note 151 and accompanying text
(discussing control requirements of U.S. tax law).
301. AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATURE CONSERVANCY AND FUNDA-
CAO PRO-NATUREZA, supra note 208, art. 4(e).
302. Id. art. 3. FUNATURA was given the responsibility of: (a) hiring the project
manager; (b) preparing the Park Project Plan (to be approved by The Nature Conser-
vancy), including a preserve design, a land acquisition plan, a management plan, and a
fundraising.plan; (c) all fundraising activities for the support of the Park Project Plan;
and (d) the actual implementation of the Park Project Plan. Id.
303. Id. art. 4. The Nature Conservancy's duties are limited to: (a) assisting
FUNATURA in the selection of the project manager; (b) providing a short-term conser-
vation fellowship for the project manager; (c) providing technical assistance in the
preparation of the Park Project Plan, consisting of hiring an advisor to the project man-
ager; (d) helping to make travel arrangements in the United States for the project man-
ager and his staff to seek funding for the project; and (e) accepting contributions for the
Park Project Plan subject to the requirements of U.S. tax law. Id. (emphasis added).
Interestingly, The Nature Conservancy exercises control over the contributions it accepts
on behalf of the Park Project Plan, id. (emphasis added), while FUNATURA is charged
with actually procuring the contributions for the project. Id. art. 3. This description of
the project's fundraising duties may seem curious given that the Nature Conservancy
committed itself to raising the U.S.$850,000 it estimated was necessary to purchase the
U.S.$2.2 million in Brazilian external debt needed to finance the project. THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY, GRANDE SERTAO VEREDAS NATIONAL PARK DEBT CONVERSION PROPOSAL,
supra note 209, at 12.
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the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natu-
ral Resources ("IBAMA"),30 a makes up the only debt-for-nature
swap project approved by the Technical Commission to date is
instructive. One can conclude that a provision allowing an inter-
national NGO to ensure that its contributions are being used for
the fulfillment of its objectives, if included in a carefully-worded
agreement, does not significantly offend the local control of the
priorities of the debt-for-nature swap project.
2. Multilateral Development Bank Debt: A Potential New
Source for Debt-for-Nature Swaps
The United States should encourage Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks (MDBs) ,305 such as the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (the "World Bank"),3°6 to donate
or sell at a discount their shares of Brazilian external debt for
debt-for-nature swaps. Brazilians view their MDB debt as more
legitimate than commercial bank debt,3 °7 and would therefore
raise less opposition to a debt-for-nature swap which converted
MDB debt.308 The MDB reluctance to donate or sell at a dis-
count developing countries' debts3 0 9 appears to neglect the fact
that several developing countries owe so much to MDBs that it is
unlikely that they will be able to repay their debts. 310 Rather
than writing off such loans, as is often done,31 these banks could
either sell the loans on the secondary market or donate them
with the caveat that the debtor country must repay a percentage
of the loans in local currency towards a conservation or other
304. CONVtNIO, supra note 207; see supra note 186 and accompanying text (describ-
ing IBAMA).
305. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (defining MDBs and discussing
their lack of participation in debt-for-nature swaps).
306. SeeJANis, supra note 74, at 291. The World Bank, owned and operated by
more than one hundred countries, promotes economic and social progress in develop-
ing countries by helping these countries raise their productivity and standards of living.
Id.
307. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text (explaning why Brazilians see
MDB debt as more legimate than commercial debt).
308. CONsORCIO, supra note 4, at 3.
309. See supra note 169 (discussing MDB reluctance to sell or donate developing
country debt due to possible violations of MDB charters and risk of impairing MDB
credit rating on international capital markets).
310. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 19, at 583.
311. Id.
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socially useful program.112
The United States has advocated a slightly different ap-
proach for the MDBs in the International Development and Fi-
nance Act of 1989. i ' The International Development and Fi-
nance Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the
U.S. Executive Directors of the MDBs to negotiate for the crea-
tion of a department in each respective bank that will actively
promote, coordinate, and facilitate debt-for-nature swaps. 14
The role of the MDB would be to assist debtor countries to re-
duce and restructure their debts by using a portion of a MDB
loan to buy back their private commercial debt at a discount on
the secondary market.3 15 The U.S. directors would also en-
courage the MDBs to promote collaboration between debtor
governments and local and international NGOs in the imple-
mentation of debt-for-nature swaps.31 6 While the U.S. position
concerning MDB participation in debt-for-nature swaps seems to
be a useful compromise between the sale or donation of MDB
debt and the MDB reluctance to do so, it is not a substitute for
direct MDB participation through donations or sales. The U.S.
policy risks failure because it does not address the Brazilian view-
point that the Brazilian external commercial debt is illegiti-
312. Id.
313. Pub. L. No. 101-240, § 1614, 103 Stat. 2508 (1989) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 262p-4i(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)); see supra note 169 (discussing policy of Interna-
tional Development and Finance Act of 1989 in context of MDB reluctance to partici-
pate in debt-for-nature swaps).
314. 22 U.S.C § 262p-4i(a). Section 262p-4i(a) states.in pertinent part as follows:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the United States Executive Direc-
tors of the multilateral development banks to--
(1) negotiate for the creation in each respective multilateral develop-
ment bank, except where the Secretary of the Treasury determines that
the provisions of this subsection have previously been met, of a depart-
ment that will-
(A) be responsible for environmental protection and resource con-
servation, including support for restoration, protection, and sustaina-
ble use policies;
(B) develop and monitor strict environmental guidelines to govern
lending activities; and
(C) actively promote, coordinate and facilitate debt-for-nature ex-
changes and the restoration, protection, and sustainable use of tropi-
cal forests, renewable natural resources, endangered ecosystems and
species in debtor countries ....
Id.; see supra note 169 (discussing MDB role .in debt-for-nature swaps).
315. 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4i(a) (3).
316. 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4i(a)(4).
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mate. 1 7 Furthermore, the policy may prove impracticable due
to restrictions in commercial loan agreements that prevent
debtor countries from repurchasing their own debt without the
consent of the lending bank.318
3. Bilateral Credit Agency Debt: Encouraging Brazilian
Participation in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
In addition to MDB debt, Brazilians consider bilateral credit
agency debt,31 9 such as loans incurred under Commodity Credit
Corporation 320 or Export-Import Bank321 programs, more legiti-
mate than commercial bank debt. 2 2 The United States should
therefore construe liberally the eligibility requirements for the
debt-for-nature swap aspects of the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative (the "Initiative") 23 so as to allow Brazilian participa-
tion in that part of the Initiative. Current eligibility require-
ments for debt reduction under the Initiative require a Latin
American or Caribbean country to meet certain conditions con-
cerning macroeconomic policies, investment policies, and debt
restructuring agreements, among other requirements. 3 24 Due to
concerns that these strict requirements would effectively pre-
clude the participation of a number of Latin American coun-
tries, including Brazil,32 5 the U.S. Congress allowed the Presi-
dent considerable flexibility in applying them if a country is mak-
317. See supra note 315 and accompanying text (discussing MDB assistance in
debtor countries' commercial debt buy-backs); supra notes 125-32 and accompanying
text (discussing Brazilian view that Brazilian external commercial debt is illegitimate).
318. See Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 4 n.9. These provisions are intended
to guard against the possibility of a debtor country causing the secondary market price
of its own debt to decrease by defaulting or threatening to default, and then repurchas-
ing its debt at discounted prices. Id.
319. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing bilateral credit agency
debt in debt-for-nature swap context).
320. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing Commodity Credit Cor-
poration and its role in Enterprise for Americas Initiative).
321. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Export-Import Bank and
its role in Enterprise for Americas Initiative).
322. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (explaining reasons for per-
ceived greater legitimacy of BCA debt).
323. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text (discussing Initiative).
324. Enterprise for the Americas Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-549, tit. VI, § 703,
106 Stat. 3664-65 (1992) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2430b); see supra note 32 (dis-
cussing eligibility requirements for debt-for-nature swap provisions of Initiative).
325. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 20; see Greener, supra note 150, at 146
(noting that Initiative's conditions may make it impossible for environmentally crucial
developing countries such as Brazil and Peru to participate).
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ing significant progress toward meeting the requirements. 26
Brazil's participation in the Initiative's debt-for-nature provi-
sions is still unclear. As mentioned above, Brazil has just com-
pleted commercial debt restructuring negotiations, 27 and has
recently carried out some structural reforms designed to liber-
alize foreign investment.3 28 The Franco administration is provi-
sionally receptive to the Initiative,3 2 9 but awaits a clarification of
how strictly the demands for macroeconomic reform and an
open investment regime will be interpreted by the U.S. adminis-
tration. 33 0 Furthermore, the Franco administration will have to
convince the Brazilian NGOs that the requirements do not
amount to what other Latin American NGOs have denounced as
"eco-imperialism."3 3 1 A liberal interpretation of the eligibility re-
quirements by the United States would therefore be the best
manner of encouraging Brazilian participation in the debt-for-
nature swap provisions of the Enterprise for the Americas Initia-
tive.
4. Strengthening Relationships with Brazilian NGOs
U.S. NGOs should continue to build relationships with Bra-
326. 22 U.S.C. § 2430b(b). Section 2430b(b) gives the President the authority to
determine, consistent with the Initiative's eligibility requirements, when a country is
eligible for benefits under the Initiative. Id.; see supra note 32 (discussing eligibility
requirements for participation in debt-for-nature swap provisions of Initiative).
327. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing Brazilian commercial
debt restructuring).
328. Carrie B. Clark, The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: Supporting a "Silent
Revolution" in Latin America, Bus. Am., Sept. 23, 1991, at 6. Brazil is currently reducing
tariffs and other import barriers, beginning a privatization program, and developing a
New Industrial Property Code designed to strengthen the protection of intellectual
property rights and pharmaceutical patents. Id. Furthermore, Brazil is dismantling im-
port barriers by abolishing its list of banned imports and lowering average import tar-
iffs. James Brooke, Brazil Opens Its Borders to Goods from Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1993, at DI.
329. Interview with Paulo Roberto Frana, supra note 203; see supra note 216 and
accompanying text (noting that proposed Brazilian debt-for-nature swap legislation in-
cludes specific provision for donation of bilateral debt).
330. Interview with Paulo Roberto Fran a, supra note 203.
331. Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 9, at 30 (citing INSTITuTO DE ECOLOGIA POLIT-
ICA, CONSECUENCIAS POLITICAS Y AMBIENTALES DE LA "INICIATIVA DE LAS AMERICAS" PARA
EL MOVIMIENTO ECOLOcICO LATINOAMERICANO [INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL ECOLOGY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 'INITIATIVE FOR THE AMERICAS' ON THE
LATIN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT] (1990) and Manifesto from the Confer-
ence of Latin American NGOs meeting at Las Lefias, Argentina (Apr. 19, 1991) (both
on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics)).
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zilian NGOs, including those NGOs that currently oppose debt-
for-nature swaps. Relationships among NGOs strengthen the
debt-for-nature swap process because the relationship between
the international NGO and the local NGO is perhaps the most
important link in a debt-for-nature swap. 32 Such a relationship
can assure a doubtful local NGO that the international NGO is
not interested in controlling local territory or imposing its pri-
orities upon the local NGO. This understanding, along with the
scientific expertise and potential increase in funds that the local
NGO may receive from a debt-for-nature swap,3 3 may convince
the local NGO to change its opposition to debt-for-nature
swaps.3 3
4
Furthermore, the increased expertise and funding arising
out of a relationship with an international NGO allows a local
NGO to exert more influence in the environmental and develop-
ment policies of its country.33 5 A strong local NGO can there-
fore play a key role in confronting issues of sovereignty33 6 and in
educating the local public about sustainable development pro-
grams.33 7 In addition, the strengthening of the local NGO is im-
perative to the international NGO's interests because the local
NGO plays an essential role in the enforcement of a local gov-
ernment's obligations under a debt-for-nature swap agree-
ment. 3 3  Local NGOs are in better positions than international
NGOs to act as "watchdogs" to verify that the local government
properly converts the donated debt according to the purposes of
the debt-for-nature swap.339 The proximity of local NGOs, along
with their knowledge of local priorities and their stakes in the
ultimate outcome of the debt-for-nature swap, makes local NGOs
332. Greener, supra note 150, at 152; see Edith Brown Weiss, International Environ-
mental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L. J. 675,
693-94 (1993) (discussing increasing importance of NGOs in "negotiation, ratification,
implementation, and enforcement of international environmental agreements").
333. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing financial rewards of
debt-for-nature swaps to local NGO).
334. Interview with Paulo Roberto Franca, supra note 203.
335. Dietz, supra note 149, at 7. "NGOs try to influence national governments
directly and indirectly by increasing public awareness and public pressures on national
legislatures." Weiss, supra note 332, at 694.
336. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 344.
337. Id.
338. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing unenforceability of
debt-for-nature swaps).
339. Greener, supra note 150, at 153.
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the focal point of political and legal action against the local gov-
ernment.3 40 Indeed, the relationship between the two NGOs in-
volved in Brazil's first debt-for-nature swap 341 demonstrates the
local NGO's dominant enforcement role. For example, the
agreement between The Nature Conservancy 342  and
FUNATURA34 3 does not include any enforcement provisions,344
but the complementary agreement 45 between FUNATURA and
IBAMA,146 a government agency, does include a choice-of-forum
provision.347 Although legally such a provision may give a local
NGO the requisite standing to enforce the agreement in court,
in practice the local NGO may lack the financial resources and
experience necessary to do so. 3 48 It is therefore in the interna-
tional NGO's best interests that the local NGO have sufficient
political clout to be capable of influencing government decision-
making and, if influence is not effective, sufficient financial re-
sources to bring a successful action against the government.3 49 A
strong relationship between the local and international NGOs is
an effective way to ensure that the former will possess such influ-
ence and resources.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of Brazilian perceptions of national sover-
eignty to include notions of international responsibility for do-
mestic activities has attenuated the domestic opposition to debt-
for-nature swaps. These vicissitudes in Brazilian attitudes will be-
340. Id.
341. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing first Brazilian debt-
for-nature swap).
342. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (describing The Nature Conser-
vancy).
343. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (describing Funda~do Pr6-Na-
tureza).
344. AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATURE CONSERVANCY AND FUNDA-
cAo PRO-NATuREZA, supra note 208.
345. CONVtNIO, supra note 207.
346. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (describing IBAMA).
347. CONVPNIO, supra note 207, cl. 9. The agreement selects the Federal District as
the forum for the determination of any doubts or questions which cannot be resolved
by the direct understanding of the parties. Id.
348. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 342.
349. See Greener, supra note 150, at 163 n.292 ("Although international [NGOs]
may have no legal recourse if the agreement is not adhered to, they remain legally
responsible to their donors and tax authorities for assuring that the agreement is not
breached.").
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come codified should the Brazilian Congress adopt the Franco
administration's proposed debt-for-nature swap reforms. These
reforms will turn what is now a restrictive debt-for-nature swap
process into a promising framework providing for an increased
number of financially and environmentally viable debt-for-na-
ture swaps on Brazilian soil. The swaps and the relationships es-
tablished through them will strengthen the already growing Bra-
zilian environmental movement and promote sustainable devel-
opment practices in a country where these practices were not
observed in past development plans. Furthermore, the changing
attitudes in Brazil present a propitious occasion for the U.S. gov-
ernment and NGOs to modify U.S. policies toward debt-for-na-
ture swaps. By changing the focal point in the description of
debt-for-nature swaps, encouraging multilateral development
banks and bilateral credit agencies to enter the debt-for-nature
swap forum, and continuing to build relationships with Brazilian
NGOs, the United States will have taken important steps to en-
sure the success of the proposed reforms and the protection of
U.S. interests in Brazilian debt-for-nature swaps.
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